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Japan’s Comparative Advantage in the Machinery Industry: 
Industrial Organization and Technological Progress*
R yu ta ro  K om iya
I. Introduction
Industrial fields where Japan now holds strong comparative advantage in 
international trade are limited to a rather narrow range, which may be 
characterized as mass-production type machinery industries. This paper asks 
why Japan has strong comparative advantage in such industries, and argues 
that the Japanese patterns of industrial and enterprise organization are 
conducive to rapid technological progress and realization of economies of 
scale in the machinery industry.
The paper first takes a look at the industries in which Japan holds strong 
comparative advantage in international trade. In short, Japan maintains 
strong comparative advantage in the mass-production type, fabricating and 
assembling manufacturing, especially in the broadly defined machinery or 
engineering industry. This includes electrical machinery, electronics, 
precision instruments and transport machinery (Section 2).
Compared with their foreign counterparts. Japan’s mass-production- 
oriented machinery industries have certain distinct characteristics which 
seem to serve as the basis of its comparative advantage in these fields. One 
of the characteristics of Japan’s industrial organization in these fields is that
The author is Professor of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University, and Director 
General, Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, MITI. This paper was 
prepared as a draft for the Jean Monnet Chair Lecture delivered in March 1993 at the 
European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The author wishes to acknowledge 
assistance and comments on earlier drafts provided by members of the research staff at 
the Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, other officials at the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, the Government of Japan, and a number of industry 
experts. But needless to say, views expressed here are the author’s personal ones, and 



























































































what I call ‘tight vertical integration’ is relatively unimportant. ‘Tight 
vertical integration’, or the ‘organization (hierarchy) -type’ relationship, is 
a form of industrial organization in which each manufacturer conducts 
product development and produces much of the required materials and parts 
within its own structure. Also, what I call ‘arm’s-length transactions’, or the 
‘market-type’ relationship, between enterprises with no special business 
relationships is less important than in other countries. What is more 
important in Japan’s machinery industry is what I call ‘loose vertical 
integration’, which is an intermediate form of relationship between the 
organization-type and market-type ones. These are long-term, continuous 
transactions and joint projects for product development among cooperating 
enterprises. The intermediate type of relationships seem to work in favour 
of technological progress because competition and cooperation coexist 
under such organizational relationships (Section 3).
In general, basic technologies that have served as the basis for good 
performance of leading manufacturers in Japan’s machinery industry are not 
those technologies which are highly original and patentable. Highly original 
technologies which cannot be easily reproduced by others play relatively 
minor roles in their success. What have been more important are technol­
ogies related to the manufacturing process, quality control and product 
planning, which result from step-by-step efforts to manufacture products 
more efficiently, to inspect them more accurately in large quantities, and to 
steadily increase productivity through rationalization, standardization and 
automation. Also important is the development of products which are well 
tailored to customers’ needs and which meet those needs better than 
products provided by competitors (Section 4).
Under an industrial organization with a relatively high weight of ‘loose 
vertical integration’, these technologies can be easily mastered by other 
manufacturers in the industry. Hence new entry has been relatively easy in 
Japan’s machinery industry. As a result, the number of major manufacturers 
in each product field in Japan is generally speaking far larger than in other 
countries, and this has served to promote competition and technological 
progress (Section 5).
There are various concepts and theories about economies of scale in 
economics and especially in the theory of industrial organization. In the 
case of the mass-production machinery industry in Japan, economies of 
scale in production on a plant basis or on a firm (enterprise) basis do not 
seem overly important: if they were really important there would be only 
one or a few manufacturers in each field. The high weight of ‘loose vertical 
integration’, one of the primary characteristics of the industrial organization 
of Japan’s machinery industry, has helped create a combination of 




























































































among them, propagate these effects to adjacent industries and contribute 
to steady and rapid technological progress. These tendencies may be regard­
ed as the most important kind of economies of scale in Japan’s machinery 
industry (Section 6). Main conclusions of the paper will be summarized in 
Section 7.
II. Industries in which Japan has Strong Comparative 
Advantage
Obviously Japan, or any country, does not -  and cannot -  have comparative 
advantage in international trade in every sector of the manufacturing 
industry.1 In fact, industries in which Japan has strong comparative advan­
tage are relatively limited in range. Generally speaking, Japan does not have 
comparative advantage in what is called the ‘plant-based industry’ in Japan, 
which requires large-scale, fixed plant and equipment, such as the chemical, 
petrochemical, oil refining, pharmaceutical, paper and pulp, glass and 
nonferrous metal industries, -  perhaps with the exception of iron and steel. 
Japan has already lost, or is losing, comparative advantage in labour- 
intensive manufacturing industries dependent on cheap, unskilled labour, 
such as textiles, toys or sundry household merchandise, as well as in those 
machinery industries which depend on cheap, unskilled labour, such as 
sewing machines, bicycles (complete ones, but not parts), wrist watches, 
transistor radios and cameras in lower- to medium-priced categories.
Most of those industries in which Japan now has strong comparative 
advantage in international trade can be categorized as manufacturing 
industries involving product design, metalworking fabrication, assembling 
in a mass-production system; that is, the mass-production machinery 
industries in a broad sense. Japan has strong advantage especially in those 
types of general machinery, electrical and electronic products, precision 
instruments and transport machinery which require medium- to high-level, 
mass-production technologies and serve a large number of users.2
Characteristics of Japanese Industries with Strong Comparative 
Advantage; Mass-Production Machinery Industry
General characteristics of the mass-production, fabricating and assembling 
type industries, the mass-production machinery industry for short, where 



























































































(1) Fabricating and assembling: In the process of production, first metal, 
plastics and other raw materials are processed into various parts, subassem­
blies and assemblies, and are then assembled into finished products.
(2) Product differentiation: Each manufacturer -  or maker -  produces and 
offers a variety of products slightly different from those of its competitors. 
Each maker relies on advertising and other sales promotion measures, after­
sales service, and marketing and service networks to support its sales and 
service activities. Therefore it is important to lay out and implement 
‘product planning’; that is to plan the kinds of new products that meet 
customers needs, set the timing of launches and model changeovers, and 
coordinate research and development, production and marketing.
(3) Mass-production type: The same product or nearly the same products 
are produced in large quantities, to be purchased by a large number of 
users. Therefore it is important to organize the manufacturing process to 
produce these products in volume at the lowest possible cost, and hence to 
increase productivity by controlling costs and reducing the ratio of defective 
products relative to the total output.
(4) Quality control: As a corollary from characteristics (2) and (3) above, 
the quality of mass-produced products must be kept highly homogeneous. 
Hence, quality control and product inspection is of critical importance.
(5) Technological progress: As a corollary from characteristics (2), (3) and
(4), technological progress has been steadily made year by year, day by 
day, both in the products themselves and in the manufacturing process.
(6) Low importance of patents for firm’s performance: In areas where 
Japanese industries have a strong comparative advantage internationally, 
patented, patentable or licensable technologies and know-hows -  patented 
technology for short -  are, by and large, not of great importance. More 
specifically, there are few Japanese firms among the leaders in Japan’s 
mass-production machinery industries that enjoy competitive advantages due 
to highly original patented technologies to which others cannot gain easy 
access. Rather, the technological advantages enjoyed by leading Japanese 
firms in the machinery industry stem mainly from know-hows other than 
patented technologies. Japanese firms have had little comparative advantage 
in research and development of patented technologies, at least until quite 
recently, although the situation is likely to change substantially in the near 
future.
In addition to the characteristics stated above, the following one may also 





























































































(7) ‘Compound’ technology: The technological advantage Japanese 
machinery firms have is often based on a combination of several different 
kinds of technologies. In this context, different kinds of technologies mean 
mechanical, precision, electrical, electronic, optical and chemical technolo­
gies. In order to develop, design and produce products in large quantities 
which require such a ‘compound’ technology, close cooperation is necessary 
among researchers and engineers in different fields and among workers with 
different skills. Also firms with different specialities need to cooperate 
closely. It seems that Japanese engineers, workers and firms are better at 
such cross-field cooperation than their foreign counterparts.
Examples of Industries that Feature Characteristics Described Above
The following are typical examples of Japanese industries with strong 
comparative advantage featuring most of the characteristics described in (1)- 
(7) above.
(a) Automobiles: A typical case with characteristics (l)-(6). Recently in a 
development related to characteristic (7), electronic technologies (automatic 
control mechanisms) are becoming increasingly important for automobiles.
(b) Machine tools, particularly numerically-controlled machine tools and 
machining centres: Japan is strong in mass-produced, standard, general 
purpose machines.
(c) Consumer electronic products: The characteristics as described in (l)-(7) 
above are obvious. Televisions, cathode ray tubes, video cassette tape 
recorders (VCR or VTR), telephones, facsimile machines, video cameras 
and TV cameras all fall into this category.
(d) Photocopiers: The characteristic described in (7) is observed here. 
Photocopiers incorporate such diverse technologies as mechanical engineer­
ing, optics, electronics, photoconductors and resins.
(e) Audio equipment: In the area of amplifiers, tuners, speakers, compact 
disc players and tape recorders, Japanese audio equipment manufacturers 
have a dominant position in markets for relatively mass-produced, high- 
quality models, but not for very high-quality, luxury models.
(f) Cameras: Japan stands without rival in the world market for mass- 
produced high performance cameras, which depend on a compound technol­
ogy of optic (lens), precision-mechanical (shutters), electronic (automatic 
control mechanisms) and electric (mini-size motors) engineering.3 But the 
camera market is now saturating, and becoming more oligopolistic than 
before. Major Japanese camera manufacturers are now diversifying into 




























































































semiconductors, and lens for video cameras, with the proportion of cameras 
in their total sales declining sharply.
(g) Semiconductors: Japan is particularly strong in mass-produced dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM) chips and other standardized chips. 
Products other than mass-produced ones are also generally marked by 
characteristics as described above in (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7). The char­
acteristic (6) is not applicable for semiconductors and semiconductor­
manufacturing equipment. With regard to characteristic (7), a powerful 
semiconductor industry will not develop in a country unless its techno­
logical levels are high in a number of closely related areas, such as 
electronics, materials (metallurgy, ceramics, chemicals), optics, and metal 
and plastic processing.
(h) Textile, construction and agricultural machinery: These sectors of 
machinery industry are not in the highly mass-production category, but are 
characterized by some of the features described above. The Japanese textile 
industry has generally lost comparative advantage except in high value- 
added apparel, with import exceeding export for many items, but the textile 
machinery industry is still quite strong. Japanese manufacturers of 
construction and agricultural machinery tend to have comparative advantage 
in smaller and mass-produced models.
Changing Pattern of Comparative Advantage
Besides the industries cited above, there exist certain labour-intensive 
machinery industries, such as watches, sewing machines and bicycles, for 
which Japan had comparative advantage in the past, but has lost or is about 
to lose that advantage due to the rise of competitors in Asian NIEs (newly 
industrializing economies) and the sharp increase in domestic wage levels. 
Some Japanese manufacturers in these industries have moved their site of 
production to Asian NIEs and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) countries or to importing countries (North America and Western 
Europe). As a result, products made in Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries, 
including those made by Japanese subsidiaries there, are driving out 
domestically-made products in the low- and middle-price ranges.4
Does Japan have Monopoly?
Does Japan have strong comparative advantage in any sector of the 
machinery industry? The answer is obviously no. In such fields as aircraft, 




























































































plants, nuclear power plants and telephone exchange equipment, Japan 
either does not have comparative advantage, or has only limited advantage. 
It appears that Japan has not been strong in areas where large research and 
development outlays are needed, or those not involving mass production. 
Moreover, even in most of the industries cited above in which Japan holds 
strong comparative advantage, there exist leading foreign manufacturers 
with more or less the same (or even superior) levels of technology as their 
Japanese counterparts. Many of these foreign firms are quite successful over 
the long run (to cite a few, Robert Bosch, Daimler-Benz, General Electric., 
General Motors, International Business Machines, Phillips, Texas Instru­
ments and Xerox). Hence it is a mistake in elementary economics to say 
that ‘Japanese enterprises monopolize the world market’. Even in the case 
where only a few foreign manufacturers compete with Japanese ones in the 
world market, such as the case of VCR or facsimile machines, this has 
nothing to do with monopoly. Monopoly refers to a situation in which a 
market is dominated by only one firm. A situation in which more than 10 
Japanese companies produce and sell VCRs, actively competing with each 
other, has nothing to do with monopoly. There are generally a number of 
Japanese firms competing with each other in industries where Japan has 
strong comparative advantage. Most of these industries are to be character­
ized as competitive oligopoly or ‘polypoly’, rather than monopoly, duopoly 
or oligopoly by few.
General Basis of Development of the Mass-Production Machinery 
Industry
It should not be ignored that the following factors have served as basic 
general conditions fostering the comparative advantage Japan now has in 
the mass-production machinery industries; Japan’s large population, the 
large size of the domestic market,5 the relatively high level of education 
that provides workers capable of developing skills required by the 
machinery industry,6 and the development of industries that support the 
machinery industry by supplying materials, castings (dies), machine tools, 
machines, electrical and electronic parts and semiconductors. Some of these 




























































































III. Organizational Characteristics of Japan’s Machinery 
Industry: Market versus Organization
Let us consider what the organizational characteristics of Japan’s mass- 
production machinery industries are compared with other Japanese indus­
tries or their counterpart industries in foreign countries.
Manufacturing Process of Machinery Industry
From the viewpoint of a ‘parent’ manufacturer -  or a ‘parent’ maker -  
which produces and sells products under its own brands,7 the process of 
‘production’ in a broader sense may be considered as consisting of six 
stages, as described below.
(1) Product planning and development, including basic research and devel­
opment (including also obtaining licence of technologies from other 
firms);
(2) Planning of the manufacturing process, including designing, production 
and installation of equipment, machinery and facilities;
(3) Production of parts, and subassemblies;
(4) Final assembly;
(5) Inspection;
(6) Marketing (including advertising) and after-sale service.8
When empirically analysing from an economic point of view the indus­
trial organization of a sector of the machinery industry, one should consider 
the following organizational problems for each parent maker.
(a) Which parts of each of the six stages above does the parent maker 
commit to undertake by itself, and how long will it continue to do so? 
Sometimes the parent makes a product itself on a trial basis or in the initial 
phase of commercial production, but lets other firms produce the item under 
subcontract later on.
(b) In which parts does the parent use the market? That is, in which parts 
does it depend on ‘arm’s length’ transactions?
(c) Which parts does the parent maker decide to let other firms undertake, 
under long-term, continuous contract relationships? The parent may have 





























































































(d) Which parts are undertaken as a joint project between the parent and 
other firms? Such a project for R&D or development of a new model may 
or may not be based upon a formal contract.
Markets and Organizations
By rough classification, (b) is the use of markets, while (a) is the use of 
organizations (or hierarchies); (c) and (d) are the use of some intermediate 
form between markets and organizations. The word ‘organizations’ here has 
the same meaning as in the economics of organization developed by 
Herbert A. Simon, Oliver Williamson and others.9
Herbert A. Simon, a Nobel-laureate economist, said in his recent paper 
“ Organizations and Markets” ,10 “No matter whether our visitor (from 
Mars) approached the United States, or the Soviet Union, urban China or 
the European Community the greater part of the space below it would be 
within the green areas” (organizations), rather than “ red lines” (markets), 
and “organizations would be the dominant feature of the landscape” . He 
also said “ the economies of modem industrialized society can more appro­
priately be labelled organizational economies than market economies” . But 
he seems to treat organizations and markets separately, in a black and white 
fashion, and does not touch on intermediate, grey forms; that is intercorpo­
rate relations based on ‘loose’ vertical integration, such as intercorporate 
shareholdings, long-term and continuous transactions, seconding and accept­
ing of top executives, joint ventures for R&D, or sales and service networks 
in marketing.11 These intermediate arrangements are very important forms 
of industrial organization, especially in Japan’s machinery industry. A 
similar remark may be made regarding the discussion of the market and the 
firm by Ronald H. Coase, another Nobel laureate, in his book The Firm, the 
Market and the Law}2
In general, as forms of enterprise and industrial organization for each of 
stages 1-6 above, or for each subdivision of stages 1-6, (a) may be called 
‘tight’ vertical integration; (b) may be called ‘arm’s length’ market trans­
actions; (c) and (d) may be called ‘loose’ vertical integration.
Generally, it is not possible to discuss a priori in a wholesale manner 
what organizational form and what kind of arrangements and relationships 
are best for each stage of manufacturing, because it depends on various 
factors and conditions. Since best forms and arrangements depend on the 
social and cultural environment, an organizational form that best suits a 
particular stage of manufacturing in one country may not necessarily be the 
best one in another country with different social and cultural traditions.
‘Loose’ vertical integration is a grey zone between ‘tight’ vertical 




























































































dividing line between ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ vertical integration is difficult to 
draw. But majority shareholding may be considered as a ‘tight’ integration 
relationship and minority shareholding as a ‘loose’ variety. 3
Organizations of Japan’s Machinery Industry
Compared with the corresponding machinery industries in foreign countries, 
in Japan’s mass-production machinery industry (c) and (d) are more preva­
lent among the four organizational problems listed above. In other words, 
the weight of ‘loose vertical integration’ is heavier, and especially (c); that 
is, long-term, continuous transactions based on mutual understanding and 
trust play an important role.
Typical organizational forms widely observed in the production process 
of Japan’s mass-production machinery industry are as follows:
In product planning and design (1), of course, the parent maker plays a 
central role, which is case (a).14 But in Japan, case (c) or (d) is often seen 
in the development and design of parts for a new product or a new model. 
The parent manufacturer and parts suppliers cooperate in developing and 
designing parts and subassemblies years before the parent puts a new 
product or a new model on the market.
In planning of the manufacturing process and the designing and 
producing of manufacturing equipment, machinery and other facilities (2), 
all cases of (a), (b), (c) and (d) are observed. But in Japan, the case in 
which the maker of a certain product produces plant and equipment by 
itself (facilities of production, equipment, machines, apparatus, dies, tools 
and jigs -  equipment in short, in the following) needed in manufacturing 
that product is rare.15 A Japanese characteristic here is that the maker of 
a certain product and the makers of equipment necessary in producing the 
product are separate but cooperate closely. They step extensively into each 
other’s domain, with the former requesting many things from the latter and 
the latter seeking to understand the former’s needs and giving advice on 
designing the manufacturing process.
For example, I was told at semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
maker in Japan that Japanese semiconductor makers tend to request various 
improvements in manufacturing equipment they wish to buy on the basis 
of their experience in using previously purchased equipment, and are 
willing to pay more for such improvements once they enter into steady, 
continuous business relationships. But it is said that US semiconductor 
manufacturers tend to buy standard models on the catalogues at as low a 
price as possible. Correspondingly, according to a Japanese semiconductor 




























































































to meet such requests as much as possible, US equipment manufacturers 
tend to give little attention to requests by the users.
It appears to me that such close relationships between manufacturers of 
finished products and the suppliers of manufacturing equipment in Japan 
tend to promote the spread of manufacturing know-how throughout the 
machinery industry.
In the production of parts (3), Japanese machinery makers are, by and 
large, characterized by the high ratio of purchases from outside subcontrac­
tors and suppliers -  plus processing by outside processors -, and by a 
correspondingly low ratio of items produced within the firm. In other 
words, the proportion of parts, subassemblies and assemblies which the 
parent manufacturer procures from outside parts makers to the total value 
of final products is high in Japan.
These organizational characteristics would be borne out clearly if the pro­
portion of the value of parts procurement to the total output by the parent 
maker, which is called the ‘gaichu’ (external procurement) ratio in Japan, 
and that of value added within the parent, which is called the ‘naisei’ 
(internal manufacturing) ratio, could be compared between machinery 
makers in Japan and in other countries. But such data are difficult to obtain 
on a comparable basis.16 I compared the ratio of the number of employees 
(a proxy variable for the value added within the parent maker) of the major 
Japanese, US and European automobile parent makers to their sales (see 
Table 1). However, there are several conceptual difficulties in such an 
international comparison. Financial reports of US and European corpora­
tions are available only on a consolidated basis, while for many Japanese 
corporations detailed financial reports are available only on an unconsolidat­
ed basis. Also, there seem to be conceptual differences in preparing the 
consolidated accounts among countries and among corporations: for exam­
ple, the number of employees of a partially-owned subsidiary seems to be 
included either wholly or not at all in the number of employees of the 
parent corporation on a consolidated basis. Moreover, parents’ management 
policies and attitudes to minority-owned (and even majority-owned) subsidi­
aries may well differ among countries and among corporations.
Admittedly there are many difficulties and pitfalls in such an interna­
tional comparison, yet it may be seen from Table 1, first, that some of the 
US and European automakers are huge, at least in terms of the number of 
employees; many of their Japanese counterparts are much smaller, especial­
ly on an unconsolidated basis.17 Secondly, Japanese parent automakers 
employ far fewer employees relative to their sales than their US or Euro­
pean counterparts: the ratio of sales to the number of employees for Japa­
nese automakers is generally higher, and often much higher than US or 




























































































engaged in few overseas operations and may be taken therefore as a more 
characteristically Japanese automaker in regard to procurement policy, and 
General Motors (GM) are compared, both on a consolidated basis, GM has 
sales about seven times higher than Mazda’s but employs 20 times more 
employees than the latter. Fiat’s sales are about 8 per cent less than 
Nissan’s, but it employs more than twice as many employees as the latter, 
both on a consolidated basis. Renault and Honda are of equal size in terms 
of sales, but in terms of the number of employees Renault is about double 
the size of Honda.
There would be several factors behind such differences but the most 
important one, I believe, is that the US or European automakers tend to 
produce more parts and equipment by themselves, whereas Japanese parent 
makers depend more heavily on outside subcontractors and suppliers in 
procuring parts and equipment.19
For example, GM makes all batteries and a large proportion of electric 
and electronic parts at its own Delco Division, but Japanese automakers 
produce no batteries and few if any electric and electronic parts by 
themselves.
Among European automakers too, there seems to be a tendency to 
produce parts and equipment by themselves instead of procuring them from 
outside parts makers.20 For example, when I visited Volkswagen’s factory 
in Wolfsburg some time ago, it was proudly explained to me that the 
factory was a highly integrated one, that the only parts not made by the 
factory were electrical parts, windows, tyres and seats, and that those which 
could be produced by metalworking were all made by the factory. Also, I 
understand that a considerable proportion of machine tools used by French 
automakers such as Renault and Peugeot are produced by themselves, 
whereas almost all machine tools used by Japanese automakers are 
produced by other firms -  which are often small in size and specialized in 
particular kinds of machine tools.
Table 1 is concerned with the automobile industry only, but a similar 
tendency seems to prevail in other mass-production machinery industries. 
For example, in the European consumer electronics industry, traditionally 
a much larger proportion of parts are produced by the parent makers and 
there exist fewer independent firms specialized in parts manufacturing and 
subcontracting than in Japan.21
In other words, the degree of ‘tight vertical integration’ of the parent 
maker in the mass-production machinery industry is much higher in the 
United States and Europe than in Japan, and the extent of ‘loose vertical in­
tegration’ is more extensive in Japan than in the United States and Europe.
I would like to cite four points regarding the production and processing 




























































































zational characteristics of Japan’s mass-production machinery industry in 
comparison with that of the US.
First, as stated above, the proportion of parts procured by a Japanese 
automaker from outside subcontractors and suppliers is generally high, and 
hence the ratio of value added by a parent maker to its total sales is low.
The second point is related to the design of parts produced by subcon­
tractors. In the United States, a high proportion of automobile parts 
procured from subcontractors are produced according to a blueprint drafted 
by the parent manufacturer and ‘lent’ to the subcontractors, whereas in 
Japan almost all parts procured from subcontractors are produced according 
to a blueprint which is drafted by the subcontractors themselves and is 
based upon the specifications given by the parent maker and then ‘ap­
proved’ by the latter. This difference was first pointed out by Banri 
Asanuma in his pioneering study,22 and since then many scholars have 
paid attention to it. This distinction reflects the high capability of Japanese 
parts makers in product development and their high degree of autonomy. 
In some cases, such ‘approved’ blueprints are the result of joint research 
and development projects by parts makers and their parent firms.23
Furthermore, in Japan’s consumer electric appliances industry, according 
to a survey on the parts procurement practices for colour TV sets and 
washing machines, parts are produced in most cases by subcontractors and 
suppliers using blueprints drafted by them and then ‘approved’ by the 
parents rather than blueprints drafted and lent by the latter.24
Thirdly, Japan’s machinery industry is characterized by deep involvement 
by the parent maker in the production process and the inspection method 
employed by their parts subcontractors and suppliers. The quality of 
finished products in terms of homogeneity and durability hinges crucially 
on the quality of the component parts purchased, and hence depends heavily 
on quality control in the production process of the parts makers. Thus the 
Japanese parent maker often sends its engineers to parts makers’ plants. 
Before making a major contract, a number of engineers are often sent by 
the parent to the parts maker’s plant for an extended period of time 
(sometimes lasting one month or more) to scrutinize the latter’s manufactur­
ing processes and inspection methods, and to propose improvements wher­
ever necessary. The parent signs a formal contract only when assured that 
the parts maker can produce and supply high-quality parts with required 
homogeneity and durability. Such a practice appears to be an exception in 
the United States and Europe: in many cases, the machinery makers there 
decide whether the quality of parts is acceptable by inspecting the sample 
parts offered by parts makers.
Another aspect of the parent’s deep involvement in the production 




























































































the parts to be procured. In the European consumer electronics industry, the 
usual practice has been that the parts subcontractors and suppliers present 
to the parent maker only the prices at which they wish to supply the parts 
in question without disclosing any information about costs, and that the 
parent chooses the parts maker offering the lowest price. This is a typical 
‘arm’s length’ type of transaction. In contrast, in Japan the parent maker 
typically requests from the parts maker detailed information on cost compo­
nents and discusses with the latter whether there is any room to reduce the 
total cost by improving production methods, the kinds of materials, 
procurement policies and so on. Such extensive involvement is possible 
because the parent maker and the parts maker work together in a long-term, 
cooperative relationship.25
In short, Japanese machinery makers depend more heavily on ‘loose 
vertical integration’ than on ‘arm’s length’ transactions in procuring parts 
from parts makers, and the parent makers and parts makers cooperate and 
interact more closely and intensively in maintaining and raising the quality 
of products and productivity.
Fourthly, the number of parts makers each Japanese automaker deals with 
is quite small, even though the ratio of parts procured from outside is much 
higher in the Japanese auto industry than for their US and European coun­
terparts. For example, GM is reported to purchase parts from some 6,000- 
8,000 parts makers (in earlier years it was said to be 20,000-30,000), but 
Japanese automakers, including Toyota and Nissan, directly deal primarily 
with only 200 to 400 parts makers. The difference is due to near absence 
of ‘arm’s length’ transactions in automobile parts procurement in Japan.
On marketing and after-sale service (6), it is commonly the case in most 
countries including Japan that the parent makers of mass-produced 
machinery products establish domestic marketing and after-sale service 
networks of their own. Regarding exports, there are cases in which a 
Japanese parent maker sets up its own marketing and after-sale service 
network in a foreign country, other cases in which it depends on a Japanese 
general trading company or import agents abroad, and still other cases in 
which it exports products on an OEM basis. All of these arrangements, 
including marketing and after-sale service networks, represent ‘loose 
vertical integration’, but the degree of ‘looseness’ or ‘tightness’ varies. In 
the machinery industry, examples of ‘tight vertical integration’ in market­
ing, that is, of a manufacturer undertaking retail sales by itself, are rare: 
they are seen, whether in Japan, Europe or the United States, only in the 
case of industrial machinery or equipment sold in small quantities to a 
limited number of customers.
Marketing networks are sometimes called ‘marketing keiretsu’ in Japan, 




























































































Japan. They are called ‘vertical restraints in distribution’ in the United 
States. The Japanese ‘marketing keiretsu’ have recently been subject to 
criticism by the US government and others that they form a barrier against 
outsiders seeking access to the Japanese market, but there are few differ­
ences among Japan, the United States and Europe in the manufacturers’ 
distribution strategies of mass-produced machinery, cosmetics and other 
differentiated products.26
Reasons behind Procurement of Parts from Outside
There is thus a general tendency for Japanese machinery makers to procure 
a higher proportion of parts manufactured -  and processed on commission -  
by outside subcontractors and suppliers than their counterparts in foreign 
countries. What are the reasons behind this?
Wage differentials between large firms and small and medium firms
In Japan, there are relatively small differences in wages among employees 
of one firm in relation to position, job classification, and skill. But the level 
of wages, or more precisely hourly labour costs, including wages, salaries, 
bonuses and fringe benefits vary widely according to the size of firm. 
Generally, the larger the firm the higher the wages paid; or conversely the 
smaller the firm the lower the wages.27
Under circumstances where wage differentials exist between large firms 
and small and medium firms as stated above, the parent maker would 
adopt a policy of procuring technically easy parts as much as possible from 
‘first-layer’ subcontractors which are smaller in size and hence pay lower 
wages than the parent. This reduces labour costs compared to making such 
parts within the parent. These ‘first-layer’ subcontractors in turn farm out 
a portion of the work to ‘second-layer’ subcontractors with even lower 
wages. This creates a pyramid-shaped production system with the parent 
firm at the top, followed by its first-layer subcontractors, second-layer 
subcontractors, and so on. Procuring parts from outside parts makers 
appears to have been prompted by a strong incentive for parent firms to 
save labour costs in the 1960s and earlier. But the importance of wage 
differentials as a cause of subcontracting has declined substantially in recent 
years as wages have risen throughout the Japanese economy due to the 
nation-wide labour shortage.
Besides, procuring parts from outside parts makers is not a practice only 
seen between large and smaller firms in Japan. In the case of the automo­
bile industry, major Japanese makers of electric auto parts and batteries, 




























































































Storage Battery and Yuasa Battery, are all quite large firms, and their wage 
levels are more or less comparable with those at ‘parent’ automakers, 
although wage levels at automakers themselves vary to some extent from 
company to company. So reference to wage differentials cannot completely 
explain the large difference between Japanese and US automakers (or 
between Japanese and European automakers as well) in their parts procure­
ment policies. The low ratio of parts produced in-house by mass-production 
Japanese machinery makers at present results, in my view, more from the 
following three factors than from wage differentials.
Benefits from division of labour
Generally there are more independent parent makers in Japan’s mass- 
production machinery industry than in other countries, and the benefits from 
division of labour appear larger in Japan. In the case of photocopiers, for 
example, there are more than ten parent makers in Japan, which have 
mostly diversified into the business from camera or consumer electric 
appliances. Since the lenses used in photocopiers are not easy to make, 
those which have diversified into the photocopier business from consumer 
electric appliances depend on a lens- or camera-maker for the designing and 
manufacturing of the lenses. For other parts and materials, such as 
photoconductors, power supply equipment, toners and rubbers, photocopier 
makers generally depend on specialized makers of such parts and materials. 
They cooperate closely with these parts (and materials) makers in R&D and 
product planning.
For example, most photocopier models usually undergo a major model 
changeover once every three years or so, and in developing a new type of 
toner for the new model each photocopier maker cooperates closely with a 
resin maker supplying toners on a long-term, continuous basis. By contrast, 
Xerox Corp. in the United States, which is about the only major non- 
Japanese photocopier maker at present, produces toners itself. According to 
Japanese photocopier makers, they would fail to keep step with new 
technology and would lag behind in introducing new models if they tried 
to make various parts and materials by themselves, because doing so delays 
development of new models. Incidentally, the number of makers specialized 
in particular kinds of parts and materials used in photocopiers are often 
fewer than the number of photocopier makers themselves, so that often one 
such supplier serves a number of photocopier makers.
In the automobile industry, electric machinery and electronics firms have 
a high level of electric and electronic expertise applicable to automotive 
parts which they have developed and accumulated through years of research 




























































































and electronically controlled systems from these specialized suppliers on a 
long-term, continuous basis.28
I cited earlier the use of ‘compound technology’ as one of the character­
istics of industries in which Japan has strong comparative advantage. In 
areas where compound technology is of great importance, it is particularly 
beneficial for firms having expertise in different special technologies to 
cooperate closely with each other while remaining independent. One of the 
benefits from the division of labour is that it enables firms to enjoy 
economies of scale in production or R&D in each kind of parts, materials, 
and manufacturing equipment. In the above example of the toner for photo­
copiers, if each of more than ten photocopier makers were to try developing 
its own toner technology the scale of production and R&D of each would 
be much smaller than the present arrangement in Japan under which one of 
seven or so resin manufacturers cooperates closely with each of more than 
ten photocopier makers.
Small organization and work incentives
Generally speaking, salaries, bonuses and other benefits received by regular 
employees and the speed of their promotion in a Japanese company depend 
on the company’s performance as measured by profits and growth rate, and 
vary greatly from company to company. On the other hand, compared with 
US and European companies, differences in wages and bonuses within a 
company between blue-collar and white-collar workers and between the 
highest paid (the president or chairman) and the lowest (newly hired young 
unexperienced employees) are far smaller in Japanese companies. Also, as 
is well known, Japanese labour unions are organized on a company-by­
company basis. Therefore, keeping the size of the company as small as pos­
sible provides and enhances the incentive to work earnestly and cooperate 
closely among employees in a Japanese company. Japanese-style personnel 
management practices, such as job rotation and promotion at regular inter­
vals, can be more easily carried out in a smaller organizational unit. Hence 
in Japan there is a tendency, especially in recent years, to keep the parent, 
‘core’ company ‘slim’; that is, to separate divisions and factories of the core 
as subsidiaries and affiliates, to keep each corporate unit as small as 
possible, and to procure parts, supplies and services as much as possible 
from the outside.'9
Cooperation and competition
In Japan’s machinery industry, the relationship between the parent maker 
and its parts and manufacturing equipment subcontractors or suppliers is 
usually not an ‘arm’s length’ one. It is not a relationship in which a parts 




























































































a maker of manufacturing equipment supplies a certain number of machines 
or manufacturing equipment only once when the parent maker expands its 
productive capacity. Rather it is a long-term, continuous relationship in 
which they deal with each other repeatedly over an extended period, and 
know each other’s capability, needs, strengths and weaknesses. Such con­
tinuous transactions, or ‘loose vertical integration’ as described earlier, are 
dominant in transactions involving parts and manufacturing equipment in 
Japan’s machinery industry.
There are cases in which such close inter-firm relationships are further 
strengthened by cross shareholdings, but such ownership relations between 
the parents on the one hand and subcontractors and suppliers on the other 
are exceptions. Even when they hold shares of each other’s company, it is 
mostly a small minority holding, except shareholdings between companies 
which originally were one company or belonged to the same tightly 
organized business group.30
As stated above, arm’s length transactions between parent firms and parts 
makers are more prevalent in the United States, and the number of parts 
subcontractors and suppliers for each parent firm is very large there. The 
reason why the number of such subcontractors and suppliers is far smaller 
in Japan is that there is a strong tendency for Japanese firms to make deals 
with mutual understanding and confidence on a long-term basis.
Although long-term, continuous transactions are dominant in parts 
procurement in Japan, the relationship between parent makers and parts 
makers is still a terminable one between independent firms, thereby leaving 
room for competition. This relationship is a ‘loose vertical’ integration, and 
contrasts sharply with the ‘tight vertical integration’ more prevalent in the 
United States or Europe. Vertical integration saves transaction costs, and 
facilitates easier transfer of information and better coordination of ver­
tically-related productive activities. But in ‘tight’ vertical integration, the 
relationships between vertically related stages of production are rigid, and 
there is no element of competition. This contrasts with ‘loose’ vertical 
integration where the relationships are more flexible and there are always 
elements of competition, an advantage not available in the ‘tight’ type.
For instance, many Japanese parent automakers usually avoid dependence 
on a single parts maker for a category of parts or components, and instead 
purchase such parts from more than one parts maker and/or produce some 
portion themselves. They produce a portion by themselves in order to know 
better: (1) whether parts makers are making enough effort to improve the 
quality and design of their parts and reduce their costs; (2) whether prices 
are appropriately set on the basis of production costs; (3) what prospects 
there are for future technological development. It is also said that each 




























































































only with itself, but instead encourages each of them to deal with other 
parent automakers as well and to become a leading manufacturer in its 
respective field. From the automaker’s perspective, the fact that a parts 
maker is capable of selling to several other automakers constitutes objective 
evidence that the parts it purchases are of top-level quality in the industry. 
Also, both from the parent maker’s and the parts maker’s points of view, 
it is thought desirable that a part maker should not depend too heavily on 
one particular parent maker.31
With regard to semiconductors, many people would consider that high 
technologies are involved and that the devices are difficult to manufacture. 
In Japan, however, many users of semiconductors in the machinery industry 
begin producing the devices themselves when the volume of their procure­
ment reaches a certain level. Makers of consumer electric appliances, 
electric parts for autos, automobiles, cameras, and computer terminals now 
manufacture semiconductors themselves. Some of them began to sell 
semiconductors to other users, but most of them do not intend to become 
self-sufficient in semiconductors -  which is ‘tight’ vertical integration. The 
purpose of their semiconductor manufacturing is -  at least in the beginning 
-  to be sure about (1), (2) and (3) in the above. Semiconductors are of 
strategic importance for the users in their product differentiation policy, so 
that many of them consider it advantageous or even necessary to be 
engaged in R&D in semiconductors and even in manufacturing thereof.
As stated above, relationships between parent firms and parts makers in 
Japan’s machinery industry are developed through long-term and continuous 
transactions. Generally speaking, the relation is not an exclusive one in 
which a parts maker deals only with a single parent firm and the latter 
purchases a particular category of parts only from a single parts maker. The 
image of a pyramid-shaped system of hierarchy with a parent firm at the 
top of the pyramid followed by first-layer, second-layer and third-layer 
subcontractors, with each subcontractor belonging to the one pyramid, 
might have been applicable to Japan’s machinery industry until the first half 
of the 1960s, but is not applicable today. Subcontracting relationships are 
now often multilateral ones.32
Even in cases where a parent maker has dealt continuously with a certain 
parts maker for years, if the parent maker were to become dissatisfied with 
the former’s performance regarding quality, prices and development of new 
products, having found its parts inferior to and costlier than those made by 
other parts makers or the parent itself, the parent maker would reduce 
orders placed with it and scale down joint projects for new models or 
products as well. Even though close cooperative relations exist, each parts 
maker still has a strong incentive to compete with its rivals by increasing 




























































































IV. Technological Basis of Japan’s Comparative Advantage
It is widely believed both at home and overseas that Japan enjoys strong 
comparative advantage in industries oriented towards high and advanced 
technology, but such a perception is not quite correct. In the mass- 
production, machinery industry where Japan has strong comparative 
advantage, what most people conceive of as high and advanced technology 
would be ‘patented (or patentable) technologies’, that is, technologies 
subject to patent and know-how licensing. But Japan’s performance in 
developing such technologies has played only a limited role in its industrial 
success, at least until recently.
Role of Patented Technologies in the Development of Japan’s 
Machinery Industry
Japan’s mass-production machinery industry has depended heavily on 
patented technologies developed by foreign firms. The industry has paid, 
and is paying, a large amount of royalties to obtain licences for foreign- 
owned patents. This is seen in Table 2, although the balance of payments 
on technology in this table covers not only the machinery industry, but all 
industries. This state of affairs will continue for some time. Generally 
speaking, highly successful Japanese firms in this field have not necessarily 
been those which developed epoch-making, original, patented technologies. 
Successful management does not necessarily go parallel with epoch-making, 
original successes in engineering, and successful management is more 
important than highly original patents and know-how, both for firms and the 
national economy.
Nowadays there are many Japanese companies which actively engage in 
R&D and spend more on R&D than on investment in plant and equipment. 
Also it is often pointed out that Japanese firms account for an increasingly 
large share of patents granted in the United States.33 Yet, it will take some 
more time before Japanese firms R&D investment will produce substantial 
returns.
Japan’s Dependence on Foreign Technologies: Automobiles
Japan is a latecomer in almost all sectors of the mass-production machinery 
industry (with a few exceptions such as VCRs, video cameras and facsimile 
machines) and has depended heavily on foreign technologies. This is 




























































































semiconductor manufacturing equipment and machine tools. This is true 
also of many industries outside the machinery sector, such as chemical, 
petrochemical, pharmaceutical, dyestuff, synthetic fibre, iron and steel, and 
shipbuilding. These industries have paid -  and are paying -  a large amount 
of royalties to obtain licences for foreign patented technologies and know­
how, and have grown by steadily acquiring them.
Take, for example, the case of the auto industry:
(1) Toyota, Mazda and Nissan tried to develop their own technologies of 
automatic transmission respectively in 1959-61 and used them in their cars. 
But due to their inferior quality, the three companies gave up using their 
own technologies around 1970, and decided to acquire technologies from 
Borg-Wamer, Ford and other foreign companies and set up joint ventures 
with them.
(2) Disc brakes were first developed in Europe, and Japanese automakers 
began to produce them around 1965 under licences from Girling and 
Bendix.
(3) Japanese automakers introduced electrodeposition painting technology 
in the latter half of the 1960s. But after Ford obtained a basic patent in this 
area in the early 1970s, the six Japanese paint manufacturers were involved 
in a patent dispute with Ford. A compromise was reached in 1974 and 
Japanese firms paid royalties to Ford until 1987.
(4) Technology of electronic fuel injection (EFI) was developed by Bosch 
of Germany, and since 1971 Japanese automakers have been using imported 
products or products produced domestically by four Japanese autoparts 
makers under licence from Bosch.
(5) Bosch also owns a patent for antilock braking systems (ABS) to prevent 
skidding, which are now beginning to be used for luxury passenger cars.
These examples show that Japanese automakers, which are now 
considered as the global leaders of the auto industry, have depended heavily 
on advanced foreign technologies. Their royalty payments have been 
substantial, though many important patents have expired by now. The 
royalty payments, however, would look small in relation to the success of 
individual makers and the Japanese auto industry as a whole.
R&D and Managerial Success
From a firm’s management point of view, it is not necessarily advantageous 
to develop important patentable technologies, own them and receive 
royalties for them. It is profitable only when royalty incomes and profits -  
properly discounted -  from the sales of the products using the patented 




























































































for a company to engage in extensive research projects, unless it is capable 
of managing its R&D activities efficiently.
To be successful in medium- to high-technology industries, it is impor­
tant for firms to make good use of other firms’ technologies, particularly 
when the level of their research capability is limited. From the 1950s to the 
1970s, many Japanese machinery makers, aware of the relatively low levels 
of their own technologies, wisely used available foreign technologies, and 
that is one of the reasons for their prosperity today.
It should be noted, however, that companies cannot evaluate, purchase 
and use profitably other firms’ patented technologies unless they have 
achieved certain levels in R&D. When licensees’ technological levels have 
risen high enough to improve the patent technologies acquired or develop 
related technologies, the royalties they have to pay are reduced, and 
eventually they become able to exchange their own technologies with the 
patent owners with little or no royalty payments. This is because when 
several companies in the same field actively spend on R&D and successful­
ly develop new technologies, it is cheaper and less cumbersome for them 
to mutually provide their technologies for others’ use than to contend at law 
over patent rights. Active investment in R&D serves as a sort of member­
ship fee in this kind of ‘patent club’.34
Patents and Barriers to New Entry
In Japan’s mass-production machinery industry, there have been few cases 
in which patent technologies constitute barriers to new entry. As far as 
technologies imported from abroad are concerned, it is generally beneficial 
for foreign patent owners to grant technologies to a number of licensees 
rather than just one. Most foreign patented technologies have been made 
available for a number of Japanese manufacturers, and patents have not 
formed high barriers to new entrants.
Important Technologies which Form the Basis of Comparative 
Advantage in Japan’s Machinery Industry
If patented technologies have carried a relatively low weight for Japan’s 
mass-production machinery industry, then what type of technologies have 
been the most important there? Generally speaking, good performance of 
the leading firms in this field has been, and still is, based on technologies 





























































































The following are kinds of technologies (in its wider sense) that have 
important effects on the performance of firms in the mass-production 
machinery industry. Few of them can be covered by patents and/or subject 
to licensing.
(1) Designing, producing, and marketing products matching users’ needs 
with good timing. It is not easy to know exactly what functions, designs 
and prices are desired by various consumers.
(2) Choosing the best organizational form, from among markets, organiza­
tions and intermediate forms (‘loose’ vertical integration) for each 
production process, as discussed in Section 2.
(3) Efficiency of manufacturing in its narrow sense; that is, organizing 
manufacturing processes and the quality control scheme to enable mass- 
production of high-quality products at lowest possible costs. This includes 
efficient organization and coordination of steps in the manufacturing 
process and the use of manufacturing and inspection methods suitable for 
mass-production. The so-called ‘QC (quality control) circles’35 organized 
at many Japanese factories contributed much to improvement in 
productivity.
(4) Automation of manufacturing processes to save labour, including the use 
of industrial robots, especially after wages have begun to rise sharply in 
Japan.
(5) Inspection methods in each manufacturing process requiring as little 
labour as possible, but which can steadily lower the ratio of defective 
products at the final assembly stage.
Efficient Organization and Coordination of Steps in the Manufacturing 
Process
The ‘kamban' system devised by Toyota, now well-known worldwide, is 
an example of an effective method of coordinating the work efficiently in 
different stages of the manufacturing process. Another example of an 
ingenious method of organizing manufacturing processes is an automated 
assembly and inspection system, introduced in the early 1970s in camera 
manufacturing in Japan which substantially reduced dependence on skilled 
workers. Through this innovation, Japan’s camera industry overtook the 
German one which had been dependent on highly skilled male workers. 
Furthermore, in 1976, a new system called the ‘unit system’ was introduced 
to produce a model called the Canon AE-1. This involved assembling the 
camera by attaching, to the core, a die-cast body, five separate major units 




























































































tured by attaching parts or small units one by one on conveyor belts. The 
new system is said to be one of the most epoch-making innovations in the 
mass-production of cameras, enabling greatly increased production of high- 
quality cameras. With defective units removed by inspection of each unit 
(block) before final assembly, it helped reduce almost to zero the ratio of 
defective products found after the final assembly.
The ‘unit system’ in Japan’s camera industry reminds me of the ‘block 
construction method’ developed by the Japanese shipbuilders in the 1960s. 
With the block construction method, several blocks of a ship are first 
assembled separately, brought to the building slip, and then combined on 
the slip. When the size of a building slip was smaller than the size of the 
ship to be built, the fore and aft parts of a ship were built separately first, 
and later united at sea. Because of this block construction method, Japanese 
shipbuilders accounted for about half of the global shipbuilding tonnage in 
their golden years of the 1960s, while their share in the productive capacity 
was only about 25 per cent.36 These were highly original, epoch-making 
innovations, but none of them could be patented or subject to licensing.3
Productivity and Labour-Management Relations
The Japanese type of corporate organization and labour-management 
relationships have contributed much to a steady and fast rise in productivity 
and product quality in Japan’s machinery industry. Japanese workers and 
labour unions have been cooperative with the management in saving labour 
and raising productivity in various ways, including extensive use of 
industrial robots and promotion of ‘QC circle’ activities. Their cooperation 
has been based on the understanding that labour-saving will be beneficial 
to themselves. In fact, Japan uses 70-80 per cent of all the industrial robots 
used in manufacturing plants worldwide.
Behind this is Japan’s employment practice under which a worker is 
employed not as a worker specialized in a particular kind of job, but as an 
employee of the company. Labour unions are hence organized on a 
company-by-company basis. In contrast, in Europe and North America -  
and in some Asian and Pacific countries under the influence of European 
culture as well - , factory workers are employed as being specialized to 
perform a particular kind of job, and labour unions are organized either on 
a job-by-job basis or on an industry-by-industry one.
The most frequently-used industrial robots in Japan are welding and 
painting robots used in automobile factories. This is a result of ongoing 
efforts made by both the management and labour unions to have robots 




























































































and painting jobs involve danger, high temperature and/or bad odour. If 
welders were replaced by welding robots in Europe or North America, 
welders would lose their jobs and the membership of welders’ unions would 
decline. If that is the case, it is quite natural that workers and their unions 
should resist such rationalization. In Japan, active use of robots means 
easier work for employees and a shift from jobs which require more physi­
cal labour and less brain work to ones requiring less physical labour and 
more brain work, possibly after some retraining. In addition, employees can 
enjoy higher wages and bonuses, faster promotion and greater employment 
opportunities if rationalization and labour-saving efforts lead to better 
performance of companies employing them.
There have been cases in Japan where workers and unions opposed the 
management’s rationalization plan, especially when it involved dismissal of 
workers or undesirable transfers. But workers and unions have cooperated 
in most efforts for rationalization by the management because they have 
usually been advantageous for workers.38
V. New Entries: A Few Examples
There have been quite a few new entries in many sectors of Japan’s mass- 
production machinery industry. The following reasons may be cited: 123
(1) Patent technologies have formed few barriers to newcomers because 
Japan has depended much on imported patented technologies, as already 
stated, and foreign patent owners have generally been willing to license 
their technologies to a number of licensees.
(2) As stated earlier, the parent makers have tried to keep themselves as 
‘slim’ as possible and have procured manufacturing parts, materials and 
equipment from outside producers. This creates the ‘loose vertical integra­
tion’ type industrial organization and a ‘multilateral’ pattern of transactions 
among parent makers and producers of parts, materials and manufacturing 
equipment. Thanks to such an environment, newcomers could procure parts, 
materials and equipment relatively easily from these producers when newly 
entering the business.
(3) In the mass-production machinery industry, the most important technol­
ogies are of a general character, such as product planning, manufacturing 
management and quality control, which are not too difficult to acquire for 
new entrants into a sector coming from other sectors within the machinery 




























































































(4) Because of the industrial organization characteristics given in (2), a new 
technology developed by a parent maker tends to propagate to others 
through parts makers and equipment producers, and one developed by a 
parts maker or an equipment producer tends to propagate to other parts 
maker or equipment producers through parent makers.
(5) The industry, or the size of the market, was growing rapidly when new 
entrants came in.
Though the mass-production machinery industry is generally oligopo­
listic, the market is more open to new entry, and generally the number of 
parent makers is larger in Japan than in other industrialized countries.39 
Many industries in Japan’s mass-production machinery industry are 
‘polypolistic’ industries -  where a number of companies compete with each 
other -  rather than monopoly, duopoly or oligopoly by few. Below are a 
few examples.
Automobiles (passenger cars)
Shortly after Japan resumed production of automobiles in 1947 after WWII, 
the industry became ‘duopolistic’, with Toyota and Nissan accounting for 
about 90 per cent of the market in the early 1950s. Except for those two 
makers, only Fuiji Heavy Industries has continued operation since then up 
to the present. The late 1950s saw new entry by Mitsubishi Heavy Indus­
tries (currently Mitsubishi Motors), Toyo Industries (currently Mazda), and 
Isuzu, while Honda, Suzuki and Daihatsu followed them in the early 1960s. 
Hino and Prince entered the market in the 1950s, but the former withdrew 
shortly afterward from passenger car production, though it is still a major 
truck maker, and the latter merged with Nissan in 1966. Recently Isuzu also 
decided to withdraw, but remains as a major truck maker.
There have been no mergers among Japanese automakers since the 
Nissan-Prince merger, though there have been a few cases of minority share 
acquisition.40 The newcomers had been engaged in truck or motorcycle 
production before launching passenger car production. Motorcycle makers 
first entered the market for light (mini) cars (with an engine size of 360- 
660cc) and then started producing larger cars.
At any rate, in Japan there are currently eight automakers mass-producing 
passenger cars with an engine size of 1,000cc or larger and marketing them 
under their own brand names. Toyota excels the others in technology and 
financial performance, followed by Nissan. But the other automakers are 
not far behind the top two in technology and new products. Luxury cars 
aside, there are only small technological gaps between the two and the other 
six. There is no country other than Japan in which as many as eight 




























































































One of the reasons, or perhaps the main reason, why the technological 
gap within the industry has remained relatively small is the rapid propaga­
tion of new technologies through the multilateral pattern of transactions 
under ‘loose vertical integration’, noted earlier. New technologies developed 
by one parent maker tend to spread to other parent makers via parts makers 
and manufacturers of equipment and machines, and those developed by one 
maker of parts or manufacturing equipment to others via parent makers. 
Also the lack of patented technologies controlled by the leading makers of 
the industry which exclude access to them by others, and industry-wide 
cooperation to produce low-pollution engines in the past may be noted. As 
a result, smaller automakers have been able to catch up with the industry 
leaders by acquiring new technological innovations without too much 
difficulty and time lag.42
In the early postwar period until about 1965, the Japanese government 
heavily protected the fledgling auto industry by import quotas, tariffs, low- 
interest loans and tax incentives. In the 1950s and 1960s MITI (the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, the Japanese Government) attempted 
to merge independent automakers into two or three makers, or to form two 
or three closely cooperating groups. But MITI’s effort was not successful. 
At that time MITI thought it desirable that automakers become more 
specialized, with each specializing in one or two fields among passenger 
cars, mini-cars, buses, larger trucks, smaller trucks and commercial vans, 
in order to realize economies of scale and avoid ‘excessive competition’.43 
But all the automakers except Prince chose to remain independent, resisting 
MITTs specialization idea. Truck and motorcycle makers wanted to enter 
the four-wheel passenger car business, while mini-car makers wanted to 
enter the regular-size car business. Most makers have more or less pursued 
a ‘full-line’ policy of producing and marketing a wide range of passenger 
cars and commercial vehicles.
VCR
Manufacturing of VCRs as home appliances is one of the few sectors in the 
machinery industry where Japan was a forerunner and in which Japanese 
manufacturers hold important patents.44 JVC (Japan Victor Corp.), Sony 
and Matsushita own one each of three basic patents essential for VCR 
manufacturing, and other companies cannot produce VCRs without using 
their patents (each of the three cannot do so without the licences from the 
other two). This has not impeded entry by latecomers, however, since the 
three makers have been quite willing to license their patented technologies. 
Many makers dependent on the three’s basic technologies have achieved 
considerable success, and VCRs have long contributed substantially to the 




























































































After commercial production of the VCR was launched by one maker in 
1975 in Japan (and hence in the world), three entered in 1976, four in 1977, 
and more entered in the 1980s. Now 15 makers are manufacturing VCRs 
in Japan. Furthermore, there are now three makers in South Korea and two 
in Taiwan.
Of the 15 Japanese VCR makers, 10 produce cylinder heads, which are 
technologically the most sophisticated part of VCRs, subject to the COCOM 
regulations. The other five Japanese makers and the Korean and Taiwan 
makers buy cylinder heads either from the above 10 or from three elec­
tronic parts makers which do not produce VCRs themselves.
The United States has no VCR makers. Europe has a few, but they are 
not strong enough to compete effectively with Japanese and Korean makers. 
Japanese leaders in VCR manufacturing produce a wide range of models, 
from popular to luxury ones, while late-comers in Japan and makers in 
other countries produce lower- to middle-priced models without sophis­
ticated functions. While Japanese consumers tend to prefer higher-priced, 
luxury models with many special functions, consumers in the United States 
-  VCRs are more widely used among households in the United States than 
in Japan -  and other countries favour simpler models.
It is not too difficult in Japan to become a ‘set maker’ (assembler) of 
VCRs by buying cylinder heads and other parts from the makers of elec­
tronics parts and assembling them. This has made it possible for latecomers 
in Japan, Korea and Taiwan to enter the VCR business successfully.
Photocopiers
Until 1970 Xerox of the United States held a very important basic patent 
of dry copiers, and there was little room for other firms to enter the plain 
paper copier (PPC) business, although there were several wet copier 
makers. In a 1970 court ruling in an antitrust case, Xerox was ordered to 
open its patents with no charge. This prompted a number of Japanese 
makers to enter the industry and today there are more than ten Japanese 
parent makers in this field, whereas few firms in the United States and 
Europe took advantage of the opportunity. As a result, Japanese makers 
together with their overseas subsidiaries now account for a share of 80-85 
per cent of the global photocopier output.45
Today there are many patents related to copier manufacturing, some of 
which are very important, but according to knowledgeable experts there are 
often ways to avoid infringing them. From the early 1980s on, Japan’s eight 
major photocopier makers have been offering a free-charge cross-licensing 
to each other. These companies, in a sort of ‘patent club’, may be con­
sidered as having achieved more or less similar levels of the photocopier 




























































































Semiconductors and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment
Japan started late in these areas, too, but Japanese makers entered when the 
industry itself was still fledgling worldwide, and when only US makers 
were ahead. The semiconductor industry is somewhat different from other 
sectors of the mass-production machinery industry in which Japan has 
strong comparative advantage, in that it is an R&D-intensive, high-tech 
field, and patented technologies carry great significance. There have been 
frequent patent disputes in this industry.
In this sector Japan has strong comparative advantage in the manu­
facturing of ‘memory-chips’ (especially DRAMs), other mass-production 
type integrated circuits and some semiconductor-manufacturing equipment. 
In many other fields Japan cannot be said to have strong comparative 
advantage, nor the production technology of mass-production type.
In Japan, consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment manu­
facturers were the first to enter the semiconductor industry, but only five 
of them were members of the famous Super LSI (Large Scale Integration) 
Technology Research Association, a government-supported joint venture 
aimed at developing super LSI technologies. Since this Association laid 
emphasis on R&D of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, however, its 
achievements were enjoyed not only by the five members but widely shared 
by the entire semiconductor industry, as time goes by.47 In its initial 
stages, Japan’s semiconductor makers depended heavily on US-made 
semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, but the rapid expansion of the 
industry thereafter prompted many firms in various industries in Japan to 
launch production of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment and 
machines, and now Japan exceeds the United States in value terms in the 
production of such equipment and machines. Most of the equipment and 
machines are not of mass-production type, and some of the manufacturers 
are small firms.
Japan’s semiconductor makers and semiconductor-manufacturing 
equipment makers have maintained close cooperative relationships, 
especially in R&D. Japan’s semiconductor industry would have never 
achieved remarkable successes without vigorous development of the 
semiconductor-manufacturing equipment industry. The two industries have 
prompted development of each other.
In turn, development of Japan’s semiconductor industry was promoted 
greatly by rapid growth of non-military ‘user’ industries, such as consumers 
electronics, telecommunications equipment and computers. For example, 30 
to 40 per cent of the production costs of a CD (compact disc) player is said 
to consist of the costs of semiconductors used in it.
Following manufacturers of consumer electronics and telecommunications 




























































































the semiconductor industry. In recent years, moreover, firms in industries 
which are totally unrelated to semiconductors, such as steel, chemical, and 
several others, have entered the industry. As a result, there are now as many 
as 90 semiconductor manufacturers in Japan.
These cases show that in Japan’s machinery industries, even in those 
which are considered high-tech oriented, there have been vigorous new 
entries, and as a result there are many firms in each industry, which has 
helped promote competition and technological innovation.
VI. Economies of Scale
Concepts of Economies of Scale in Economic Theory
What is meant by ‘economies of scale’ in economics? Below is a list of 
several answers to this question given by economic theory and especially 
the theory of industrial organization.
(1) Economies of scale based on the size of factories or firms: When the 
average cost curve is drawn for a certain product with the output of a 
factory along abscissa and costs along the ordinate, the long-run average 
cost reaches the lowest value for a certain range of its output. This range 
represents the ‘optimum size’ factory, which realizes economies of scale at 
the factory level. The left-hand end of this range is the ‘minimum optimum 
size’ factory of the industry producing this product. The average cost curve 
including the overhead costs of the firm’s headquarters is lower for a firm 
with several factories than one with only one factory. Hence the firm with 
several factories enjoys economies of scale on a firm basis. But when the 
size of the firm is too large, it may suffer from ‘diseconomies of scale’, so 
that there is a certain range of ‘optimum size’ for a firm as well. The 
concept of economies of scale here is relative to the size of the market: 
economies of scale are said to be important or substantial when the 
‘minimum optimum size’ factory or firm is large relative to the size of the 
market served by the industry.
(2) Economies of scope: When a firm engages in productive activities in 
several different fields, this is thought to help cut the costs involved in 
maintaining headquarter functions, enable more efficient utilization of in- 
house resources and productive capacity, create ‘benefits from diversifica­
tion’, and lower the unit cost of products. Pursuit of ‘economies of scope’ 




























































































the right balance -  which would change over time -  between diversification 
and specialization.
(3) Economies resulting from expansion of the industry: This is also known 
as ‘Marshallian external economies’. When a large number of firms produce 
the same kinds of products under perfect competition, the average cost 
curve of each firm shifts downwards because of greater specialization and 
division of labour, and because of the development of related firms supply­
ing materials, equipment and services to the industry.
(4) Learning effect: This is an effect which shifts the average cost curve 
downward, as a result of the increase in cumulative output (the integral 
value of output), as firms or the industry accumulate experience and achieve 
technological progress.
Measurement of Scale in the Machinery Industry
To what extent are these concepts of or approaches to economies of scale 
applicable to the machinery industry? First of all, it needs to be noted that 
in the machinery industry it is difficult to measure output, which is the 
crucial variable when considering economies of scale.
All the concepts stated above are generally based on assumptions that:
(i) output is a single commodity which is homogeneous and of which the 
quantity is readily measurable;
(ii) one kind of output is produced by a factory or firm;
(iii) all factories and firms in a particular industry have the same or similar 
manufacturing processes with the same degree of vertical integration, 
that is, they procure raw materials and parts in the same way, and 
supply products manufactured to the same level of processing.
In the case of economies of scope (2), it is assumed that one firm 
supplies several kinds of outputs, but each output is considered as homo­
geneous. To measure the economies of scale in (3) and (4) resulting from 
the downward shift of the average cost curve in line with the industrial 
growth the following additional assumption is necessary:
(iv) a firm’s or an industry’s output remains homogeneous and unchanged 
over the long ran, or if it changes, the change can be measured 





























































































The assumptions (i)-(iv) are more or less admissible for industries such 
as oil refining, chemicals, power generation, and cement, whose output is 
homogeneous. But in the case of the machinery industry, such assumptions 
are unrealistic, due to three problems: output mix, vertical integration, and 
product quality. Taking the automobile industry as an example:
(a) Output mix: Output mix differs from one factory to another, from one 
firm to another, and from time to time. The composition of output value, 
namely the proportions in output of passenger cars, trucks, commercial 
vehicles, and various parts, are different for different factories and firms, 
and at different times. Even within the category of the normal-size 
passenger cars the most expensive, luxury model would be priced 10 to 15 
times higher than the cheapest one, and hence the counting of output by the 
number of cars produced is often meaningless.
(b) The degree of vertical integration: The proportion of parts produced 
within a factory or a firm, or the degree of vertical integration at each 
factory and firm, varies a great deal from one factory to another, from one 
firm to another, and from time to time. A part or a subassembly for a 
passenger car assembled in a factory may be made in-house, by another 
factory of the same firm, by a parts maker within the automobile industry, 
or by a firm belonging to some other industry, or it may be imported from 
a foreign country.
(c) Product quality: Steady improvement of the quality of products of the 
machinery industry makes it difficult to measure, over time, the output, or 
the size of a factory, firm and the industry, in value terms. When one 
measures the change in the output level or added value of a firm or an 
industry over time by using some price deflators for output, it would be 
bound to underestimate quality improvement, and hence the output growth 
and technological progress.
These three problems that complicate quantitative measurement of 
products are more or less common to the machinery industry, which always 
produces differentiated products through complex division of labour and is 
steadily improving the quality of products. Therefore, it is difficult just to 
measure the output, the size of factory or firm and the scale of industry, 
and it is even more difficult to measure economies of scale.48
Economies of Scale Based on the Size of Factory or Firm
With these difficulties in measuring the economies of scale in the case of 




























































































economies of scale in Japan’s mass-production machinery industry.
It is obvious that the ‘minimum optimum size’ of a factory in the mass- 
production machinery industry is fairly large, since its technology is of 
mass-production type. But in the industries cited in Section 2 there are 
generally a number of firms in Japan, and many of them operate more than 
one factory. Moreover, several latecomers made successful entry as the 
industry developed. It is presumed, therefore, that the minimum optimum 
size of factory or firm relative to the size of market is not so large. If 
economies of scale based on the size of factory or firm were large in an 
industry relative to the size of market, the industry would have been 
dominated by one or only a few giant firms.49
The fact that there are few cases of monopoly, duopoly, or oligopoly by 
few in Japan’s mass-producing machinery industry indicates that economies 
of scale at the factory or firm level are not overly important there.50
The automobile industry is often considered as one of the industries 
where economies of scale based on the size of factories and firms are 
substantial. For example, the minimum optimum scale of a passenger car 
factory today is said to be something like 200,000 cars in annual output. In 
fact, automakers whose sales come down below a certain level are often 
forced to go out of business or to merge with others in many countries. But 
in the automobile industry where a large proportion of parts and assemblies 
are procured from outside parts makers, as in Japan, smaller automakers can 
make up for the disadvantage by purchasing parts from parts makers and 
undertaking joint development projects with them.
A notable tendency in recent years is that automakers are producing an 
ever widening variety of models to satisfy preferences of diverse, sophisti­
cated users. Japanese automakers appear to have developed technologies to 
produce at relatively low costs a wide variety of models, each in small 
quantities. An interesting trend is that one automaker is producing a number 
of models (brands) which are essentially the same and whose appearances 
are only slightly different from each other, and is selling them under 
different brand names through its different nationwide dealership net­
works.51 Thus, dealers are competing keenly to sell similar cars made by 
the same automaker.52
This can happen, I suppose, because the demerits of diseconomies of 
scale due to the costs involved in producing different models and 
organizing not just one but several nationwide dealership channels are 
outweighed by the merits from dynamic competition among dealers and 
dealership channels and from the advantage of each dealer having a 




























































































Economies of Scope and Benefits from Specialization
In Japan’s machinery industry, economies of scope are an important factor 
when firms come into a rapidly expanding industry, or when they diversify 
into other fields after the market for a product becomes saturated. In other 
situations most makers seem to lay emphasis on specialization and division 
of labour.
Marshallian External Economies
The concept of Marshallian external economies is originally one applied to 
industries under perfect competition. Also it is perhaps not a concept 
applicable to situations where rapid technological progress is taking place. 
The concept applies better to what is called the ‘producing region’ (satichi) 
type industry, which is composed of a large number of small- and medium­
sized firms than to an oligopolistic or polypolistic industry, such as the 
mass-production machinery industry.53
But in Japan’s mass-production machinery industry, parent makers are 
relatively small compared with their counterparts in other countries, and the 
producers of parts, materials, and manufacturing equipment have grown and 
played important roles in the process of development of the industry. 
Because of this organizational characteristic of the industry, technologies 
and management know-how acquired by a parent maker tend to propagate 
to others more readily through producers of parts and manufacturing 
equipment, and those acquired by a parts maker or an equipment maker do 
so through parent makers. Technological innovations by one firm and the 
growth of the entire industry have the effect of ‘external economies’ by 
lowering the average cost curve of each firm within the industry with a 
certain time lag. But this effect is not of static character, nor is it reversible 
as conceived of in the concept of ‘Marshallian external economies’: it is an 
irreversible effect resulting from technological progress and industrial 
development.
Learning Effect
Obviously, the Teaming effect’ has played a very important role in the 
development of Japan’s mass-production machinery industry. But it would 
be simplistic to think that the average cost curve moves downward in 
proportion to the accumulated output of each firm or the entire industry. If 




























































































for a latecomer country such as Japan to catch up with the forerunner 
countries, and latecomer firms to catch up with early-starter firms: 
latecomers would be hampered by the wide gap in accumulated output 
between them and the forerunners. Moreover, the latecomers often have to 
pay royalties on patented technologies to the forerunners. The latecomer 
country’s only obvious advantage would be lower labour costs.54
With the exceptions of VCR manufacturing and a few other products, 
Japan started later (sometimes much later) than Europe and the United 
States in mass-production machinery industries. If the learning effect was 
simply in proportion to accumulated output, Japanese makers would never 
have been able to bridge the gap.
Industrial and Enterprise Organization and Technological Progress
I hypothesize that one of the reasons why Japan’s mass-production 
machinery industry could have caught up with and eventually outperformed 
their foreign counterparts is that Japan’s industrial and enterprise organiza­
tion promotes and accelerates learning effects and technological progress. 
The following reasons may be pointed to.
(1) There are relatively more parent makers in Japan than in other major 
industrialized countries and they are always keenly competing.
(2) Vertical integration (of the ‘tight’ variety) of parent makers is relatively 
limited in Japan, and both parent makers and parts makers are relatively 
small in size. This, together with Japanese employment, remuneration, and 
promotion practices, encourages both blue- and white-collar employees to 
work earnestly, leading to steady improvement in productivity and product 
quality.
(3) In Japan, production of parts and manufacturing equipment are based 
more on ‘loose’ vertical integration than on ‘arm’s length’ transactions. 
‘Loose’ vertical integration depends on long-term, continuous business 
relations between the parent maker and producers of parts and manufactur­
ing equipment. They are in close contact in that they exchange information 
and engage in joint R&D projects for parts and manufacturing equipment. 
Yet such a ‘loose’ vertical integration relationship always involves an 
element of competition, largely absent in vertical integration of the ’tight’ 
variety. Parent makers and producers of parts and manufacturing equipment 
are cooperating partners, but they are competing with their respective rivals 
at the same time. Also, ‘loose’ vertical integration brings the benefits of 
specialization and division of labour, and sometimes also realizes economies 




























































































(4) Under such industrial organization, ‘innovators’ in the sense of Joseph 
Schumpeter tend to be followed more quickly by others; and who is the 
‘innovator’ and who are the ‘followers’ is always in flux.
(5) Since makers of parts, materials and equipment usually deal with more 
than one parent maker,55 innovative technologies developed by one parent 
maker are readily propagated to other parent makers through them, as can 
technologies developed by one of the producers of parts, materials and 
equipment be passed on to others through parent makers. Thus technologi­
cal innovation tends to spread rapidly among firms in the industry.
(6) Under Japanese-type enterprise organizations, the corporate unit is kept 
as small and ‘slim’ as is compatible with economies of scale, and under 
Japanese employment practices, there are strong incentives for workers and 
labour unions to actively contribute to enhancing productivity (see 
Section 4).
VII. Conclusions
The industries in which Japan has strong comparative advantage in 
international trade are mostly the mass-production type, fabricating and 
assembling manufacturing industries; that is, those producing machinery, 
electric machinery, electronics, automobiles and precision instruments for 
a large number of users. The characteristics common to these fields include 
product differentiation, mass-production, quality control, steady technologi­
cal progress, and ‘compound’ technology -  the combination of several 
different kinds of technologies. Patented technologies play a relatively 
minor role in these fields.
Among the typical industries where Japan enjoys strong comparative 
advantage are automobiles, machine tools -  especially mass-produced 
numerically-controlled machine tools - ,  VCRs and other consumer 
electronics products, memory chips, photocopiers, audio equipment, 
cameras, textile machinery, construction machinery, and agricultural 
machinery. On the other hand, even within the broad machinery industry, 
Japan does not have comparative advantage, or has only limited advantage, 
in aircraft, jet engines, mainframe computers, large-sized machine tools, 
electric power generation equipment, and nuclear power generation 
equipment. Generally, Japanese makers have not, at least to date, been a 
strong competitor in those areas which require heavy R&D expenditure, 
and/or which do not use mass-production technologies. Japan does not have 




























































































chemicals, petrochemicals, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, paper and 
pulp, glass, and nonferrous metal.
The factors that have helped develop the mass-production machinery 
industries in Japan include its relatively large population and large domestic 
markets, the high level of education among the populace that has contribut­
ed to bringing up workers who can readily master the complicated technolo­
gies required in the machinery industry, and the strength of those industries 
which support the machinery industry such as the ones producing iron and 
steel, other metals, plastics, dies, machine tools, electric and electronic 
parts, and semiconductors. Some of these are themselves mass-production 
machine industries (Section 2).
Compared with similar industries in other industrialized countries, a 
characteristic of Japan’s mass-production machinery industries is that they 
depend relatively more on ‘loose’ vertical integration -  such as long-term, 
continuous transactions and joint R&D projects -  than on ‘tight’ vertical 
integration and ‘arm’s length’ transactions in the production of -  and R&D 
related to -  parts, materials and manufacturing equipment.
The number of employees of ‘parent makers’ in Japan’s machinery 
industry is generally much smaller than that of their US or European 
counterparts, in relation to their sales. Large US and European manufac­
turing firms employ far more employees than Japanese firms. The principal 
reason for the smaller number of employees at Japanese parent makers is 
that they procure a large proportion of parts and other inputs from outside 
subcontractors and suppliers. The three main factors in procuring the high 
proportion of parts and other inputs from outside are (1) the benefits of 
division of labour based on specialization, (2) the higher motivation among 
workers in smaller enterprise units, and (3) maintaining cooperative but at 
the same time competitive relations among organizational units.
It should be obvious that division of labour among specialized manufac­
turers contributes to productivity. With regard to the second point, the 
wages, salaries and other benefits Japanese workers receive generally differ 
from company to company, depending on the companies’ performance in 
terms of profits and the rate of growth. Labour unions in Japan are also 
organized on a company by company basis. So the smaller the corporate 
unit is, the higher the motivation of the workers. On the third point, the 
relations between the parent maker and the producers of parts and 
manufacturing equipment are usually long-standing, continuous ones, based 
on mutual trust and understanding of the partners’ capability, needs, 
strengths and weaknesses.
But even when parent makers and their part or equipment makers have 
long-term, continuous relationships, the two are still different firms and not 




























































































market economy always work between parent makers and parts makers. If 
a parent maker is not fully satisfied with one of its parts suppliers 
concerning the quality of products, technology or services, the former will 
reduce the procurement from the latter and curtail the number of joint 
development projects for new products.
On the side of parts suppliers, in turn, most of them deal with several 
parent makers and will reduce the transactions with any of them over the 
long run if the transactions are not satisfactory to them. The parent maker 
usually procures the same kind of parts from several subcontractors and 
suppliers, and/or produces a certain amount of the parts by itself to avoid 
depending fully on only one parts maker for the supply of parts. The parent 
maker produces the parts by itself in order to know production costs 
precisely and to assess the potential for productivity improvement and 
future technological progress.
Thus the market principles and competitive factors work between the 
parent makers and parts makers, even though their relationships are long­
term, continuous and cooperative ones. They create a strong incentive for 
both the parent makers and the parts makers to improve their productivity, 
reduce costs, and invest in research and development. Such multilateral 
competitive factors always exist among corporate organizations that are tied 
to each other in ‘loose’ vertical integration. The Japanese machinery 
industry today cannot be characterized, as has often been done, as a 
hierarchical, pyramid-shaped system with parent makers at the top and parts 
makers in several layers underneath.
In addition to the three factors (1), (2) and (3) above, a fourth factor that 
often used to be cited as a reason for the high proportion of outside 
procurement of parts among Japanese machinery makers is the so-called 
‘dual structure’ in Japanese industry. In Japan, the difference in wages due 
to the difference in skills or jobs or between the white-collar and blue-collar 
workers is smaller, while the difference in wages between large and small 
firms is more pronounced, than in other industrialized countries. This is true 
even today. So, in order to reduce the production costs, the parent maker 
tends to procure components that do not require high-level technologies or 
skills from outside subcontractors and suppliers that employ workers at 
lower wages.
This tendency was clearly observed in earlier years, especially until the 
mid 1960s. But as the labour market has become tighter since the late 
1960s this fourth factor has become less important, particularly under the 
recent severe labour shortage. Moreover, the difference in the wage levels 
between parent makers and parts makers has not always been large. For 
instance, in the automobile industry some of the parts makers are very large 




























































































Battery, Japan Storage Battery, Yuasa Battery, and their employees have 
been as well-paid as their counterparts in Toyota, Nissan, or Honda. The 
remarkable difference in the proportion of outside procurements of parts, 
or, in other words, the difference in the degree of ‘tight’ vertical integration, 
between US and European automakers and Japanese ones cannot be 
explained primarily by this factor (Section 3).
As the basis for Japan’s strong comparative advantage in the mass- 
production manufacturing industry, the importance of high technology, or 
more precisely the technologies that can be patented or licensed, has been 
relatively limited so far. The superior performance by Japanese leading 
firms in this area is supported more by technologies related to the 
manufacturing process, quality control, and product planning rather than by 
highly original patented technologies. Japanese leading makers in these 
fields excel in rationalization, automation and standardization of the 
manufacturing processes, in efficiently organizing and coordinating various 
steps of production, in raising the quality and functions of products through 
accumulation of small improvements, in establishing the inspection systems 
that guarantee homogeneity of products, and in developing and marketing 
the products that meet users’ needs well.
Japanese employment practices have played an important role in making 
the bit-by-bit, but steady, improvements in productivity in Japan’s 
machinery industry. The outstanding feature of the Japanese employment 
system is that workers are not employed to do a particular job, but are hired 
as ‘general’, regular employees of the company and are covered by a 
lifetime employment umbrella. Also constituting the Japanese corporate 
culture is the management-labour relations based on the labour unions 
organized on a company-by-company basis. Whereas in the United States 
and European countries -  and also in the Asia-Pacific countries under 
strong European influences - , a worker is generally hired to do a specific 
job, and a labour union (or trade union) is organized for each type of job, 
or for each industry. The characteristics of Japanese employment practices 
and the labour-management relations have contributed to an improvement 
in productivity in the Japanese machinery industry.
For example, industrial robots are most widely used in Japanese factories: 
70 to 80 per cent of all the industrial robots in the world are operated in 
Japan. The welding and painting robots at auto plants are the most 
numerous industrial robots in Japan. This is because workers in Japan’s 
auto industry disliked these two jobs for the danger, heat and odour 
involved. Japanese automakers and labour unions cooperated eagerly to 
replace human work in these kinds of jobs by robots. In the United States 
or European industries, a massive instalment of robots to do welding or 




























































































painters, and therefore would meet strong oppositions from the labour 
union. At Japanese plants, workers who have been doing welding or 
painting jobs are relocated to less unpleasant jobs when robots are installed 
in welding and painting shops. The rationalization in Japan generally means 
the amount of tedious physical labour is curtailed and the workers are 
shifted -  sometimes after retraining within the company -  to jobs that 
require more intelligence and discretion (Section 4).
The characteristics of Japan’s mass-production machinery industry 
described above have promoted the propagation of a new technology 
developed by one parent maker or one parts maker to others in the industry. 
They have also made it easier for latecomers to enter the industry. As a 
result, the number of parent makers in one field is generally larger in Japan 
than in other industrialized countries. There are, for instance, eight 
independent Japanese automakers that produce, market and export passenger 
cars with engine replacement of l,000cc or larger. There were only a 
relatively small number of semiconductor manufacturers in Japan when 
integrated circuits were first manufactured and sold in Japan in the mid 
1960s. Over three decades, there has been continuous entry of a large 
number of newcomers into the industry: first, makers of consumers 
electronics and telecommunications equipment entered the industry, 
followed by various users of semiconductors, that is, manufacturers of home 
electric appliances, electric and electronic automobile parts, automobiles, 
camera and computer terminals, and most recently firms in entirely 
unrelated fields such as steel makers and chemical companies. There are 
now some 90 companies manufacturing semiconductors in Japan. In VCRs, 
one company started production in 1975, three more in 1976, and four in 
1977, and as a result of the active new entry into the market in the 1980s, 
there are now 15 ‘set makers’ of VCRs in Japan. The PPC photocopier 
market was once monopolized by Xerox of the United States, which owned 
a basic patent for dry copying. But after an antitrust court ruling in 1970 
which ordered Xerox to grant the patent licence free of charge, Japanese 
camera makers and consumer electronics makers entered the market in 
droves. And now 11 Japanese photocopier makers combined account for 80 
to 85 per cent of the world market (Section 5).
The sectors of the machinery industry where Japan has strong compara­
tive advantage are of the mass-production type so that ‘economies of scale’ 
are naturally a significant factor there. But economies of scale based upon 
the size of the plant or firm, relative to the size of the market, are 
apparently not so important in most sectors of the industry. It is demon­
strated by the fact that quite a few parent makers coexist -  and often co­




























































































The concept of ‘Marshallian external economies’, which presupposes 
perfect competition and a given level of ‘technology’, and where the 
production function and the cost function are assumed to shift in proportion 
to the level of the industry’s total output, in a way reversible with respect 
to time, is not a concept that can describe well the conditions in the mass- 
production machinery industry in Japan. This industry is under competitive 
oligopoly -  or polipoly - ,  and technological progress has been steady, with 
the production function and the cost function steadily shifting in an 
irreversible way. The situation in the industry can be better described by 
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of economic development, where new techno­
logies invented by ‘innovators’ are the driving force of development and are 
propagated to ‘followers’, rather than by Marshallian external economies, 
although who are the ‘innovators’ and who are ‘followers’ are roles which 
change frequently.
The theory of the Teaming effect’ which assumes that productivity rises 
in proportion to the accumulated output does not in its simple form seem 
to explain well the situation in the industry. If the learning effect was really 
important, Japan which started later than the United States or Europe in 
most of the mass-production machinery industry could not have caught up 
with the forerunner countries, nor could the latecomer firms in Japan have 
become able to compete with the forerunning firms (Section 6).
In my view, the ‘economies of scale’ in Japan’s mass-producing 
machinery industry have much to do with the characteristics of its industry 
organizations. The industrial organization in this field in Japan is character­
ized by a relatively large weight of ‘loose’ vertical integration -  long-term, 
continuous and cooperative relationships between parent makers and 
manufacturers of parts, materials and equipment - ,  and by low weights of 
both ‘tight’ vertical integration and ‘arm’s-length’ transactions, concerning 
the production, processing, designing and R&D of parts and manufacturing 
equipment. These characteristics make possible the long-term, continuous 
and close cooperation among firms that could not develop through ‘arm’s- 
length’ transactions, while creating competition through multilateral 
transactions that could not exist in ‘tight’ vertical integration.
Under such industrial organization, a new technology or a new product 
developed by one firm tends to spread to the other firms in the industry 
rapidly through the network of ‘loose’ vertical integration. Thus, the 
structure of Japan’s mass-production type machinery industry is more 
conducive to the diffusion of new technologies among firms, and therefore 
to the overall technological progress of the industry, than that of its 
counterparts in other industrialized countries where a small number of 




























































































Thus ‘economies of scale’ in Japan’s mass-production machinery industry 
have worked through rapid and steady technological progress and the 
learning effect for the entire industry under the industrial organization 
characterized by ‘loose’ vertical integration.
Finally, the reason why Japan has strong comparative advantage in the 
mass-production type machinery industry is that Japan’s industrial and 
enterprise organization characterized by a larger weight of ‘loose vertical 
integration’ and by smaller and ‘slimmer’ enterprise units than in other 
industrialized countries is conductive to steady and fast technological 





























































































1. Those who discuss international trade problems in terms of international ‘competitive­
ness’, rather than ‘comparative advantage’, of industries do not quite understand the 
basic factors underlying the pattern of international trade. If many industries of a 
particular country have strong international competitiveness, sooner or later that 
country’s level of wages and rent on land will rise and the exchange rate will appreciate, 
resulting in a loss of ‘competitiveness’. What determines a country’s pattern of trade and 
the trade performance of its individual industries is n o t so much the productive 
efficiency of a domestic industry in relation to its counterpart industry in foreign 
countries, as the productive efficiency of an industry relative to other industries w ith in  
the country. Hence, by definition only a limited range of industries within a country 
have strong comparative advantage.
2. In order to strictly identify a country’s comparative advantage or strong comparative 
advantage, it is necessary to describe the pattern of trade and analyse the factors behind 
it. I have not gone into such an analysis, however, and have instead conjectured the 
pattern of Japan’s comparative advantage on the basis of general observation. It should 
be mentioned that there are industries outside of the machinery industry where Japan 
seems to have strong comparative advantage rather unexpectedly, such as fishing nets, 
full-colour printing, musical instruments, ‘new’ (high-quality) synthetic fibre textiles and 
speciality fibres (carbon, photo, polyacetal, etc.). The reasons why a country has 
comparative advantage in a particular industry are apparently highly complex.
3. Patented technologies cannot be said to be unimportant in camera manufacturing, and 
there have been patent disputes between foreign patent owners and Japanese camera 
makers. But Japanese camera makers have long cooperated in R&D through a research 
association for optical industry technologies (established in 1956 with assistance from 
MITI and dissolved in 1981), and they have mutually licensed out patents they owned. 
Therefore as far as patented technologies are concerned, the technological levels of 
Japan’s leading camera makers have been more or less comparable: when one of them 
produces and puts on the market a ground-breaking new model, it has been soon 
followed by other makers.
4. Industries in which Japan had strong comparative advantage in the past, or still has 
such advantage now to some extent, are characterized by some of the features (l)-(7) 
and/or the following ones:
(8) Programming of the successive stages of the production process and coordination of 
the work thereof are of great importance.
(9) Short delivery time and/or accuracy in the time of delivery is important.
Examples may be textiles, iron and steel, and shipbuilding.
5. Among Japan’s mass-production machinery industries, only a few had a high ratio of 
exports to sales in their early stages of development. Examples are sewing machines, 
cameras, transistor radios and audio equipment In the early post-World War II period, 
many Japanese machinery industries developed by producing for domestic markets under 
various forms of government protection (tax incentives, low-interest financing, import 




























































































foreign investment. But such protective measures for the machinery industry were 
gradually abolished under the Japanese government’s trade (import) and foreign 
exchange liberalization programmes (mainly from 1963 to around 1972) and the ‘capital 
liberalization’ (liberalization of inward direct investment) programmes (mainly from 
1967 to around 1976), as Japan became a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade in 1955, and its Article 11 member, an Article 8 member of the International 
Monetary Fund, and a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development in 1964.
6. Also, when Japan’s manufacturing industry grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s the 
government actively supported the education of engineers and scientists by setting up 
schools of engineering and science in universities and elsewhere, and by expanding the 
capacity of existing ones.
7. ‘Parent’ manufacturers or makers, as defined rather loosely in the text, are the central 
agents in the machinery industry and are distinguished from ‘cooperating firms’ or ‘parts 
subcontractors’ (or suppliers), which produce and/or process parts and assemblies on the 
formers’ behalf. The parent manufacturer is occasionally called ‘set-maker’ (that is, 
assembler) in some Japanese industries. Its definition given in the text is not quite 
satisfactory. For instance, a somewhat strange business practice known as ‘original 
equipment manufacturing’ (OEM) is now seen in the production of a wide range of 
products including automobiles, tractors (combines), construction machinery, machine 
tools, radios, television, watches, VCRs, computer terminals, personal computers and 
many other products. In the case of automobiles, finished cars such as passenger cars, 
vans and pickup trucks are or were supplied by Suzuki, Isuzu, and Korea’s Daewoo to 
General Motors, by Mazda to Ford, and by Mitsubishi to Chrysler. These cars are sold 
under the brand names of the companies supplied with them. In the case of NUMMI, 
a Toyota-GM joint venture in the United States, the output is shared by Toyota and GM 
for sale. In Japan, Suzuki’s Celvo is almost the same as Mazda’s Carol, and in fact the 
two models are produced at the same Suzuki plant. In the case of VCRs, a leading 
Japanese manufacturer which exports some 50 per cent of its total production, 
manufactures a substantial part (10-20 per cent of total production) on an OEM basis 
for several foreign companies with their brands. Some of the world’s major retail 
companies, such as Sears-Roebuck of the United States, purchase good-quality, low- 
priced goods around the world on an OEM basis and sell them under their own brands. 
Even leading firms in an industry supply a variety of products to other firms in the 
industry on an OEM basis. Recently IBM was reported to have decided to supply a 
certain type of personal computer to Hitachi on an OEM basis. Conversely, Hitachi was 
reported to be negotiating to supply other types of personal computers to IBM, also on 
an OEM basis.
8. Besides these six stages, there is a stage prior to (3), that is the production of 
materials for the machinery industry, such as steel, special steel, nonferrous metals, 
plastics and chemicals. But it is an exceptional case where an automaker is engaged in 
extensive ‘backward integration’, and owns iron and steel plants and iron ore mines as 




























































































9. See H. A. Simon, A dm in istra tive  B eh av ior , New York: Macmillan, 1947, 3rd ed., 
1976; O. Williamson, M arkets an d  H ierarch ies, New York: Free Press, 1975; Kenichi 
Imai, Hiroyuki Itami, and Kazuo Koike, E conom ics o f  In tern a l O rg a n iza tio n s  (in 
Japanese), Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha, 1982.
10. H. A. Simon, J ou r, o f  E con. P ersp ec tives , Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1991).
11. For a discussion of the importance of such intercorporate relations, see K. Imai, H. 
Itami, and K. Koike, The E conom ics o f  In tern a l O rgan iza tion s , op . c it., chapters 7 and 
8; K. Imai, The S o c ie ty  w ith  Inform ation  N etw o rk  (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1984; K. Imai 
and I. Kaneko, O n N etw o rk  O rgan iza tion s  (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1988.
12. The University of Chicago Press, 1988. See especially ch. 2.
13. Masahiko Aoki characterizes the relationships between the Japanese parent 
manufacturer and its subcontractor as “ quasi integration” . See M. Aoki, In form ation , 
In cen tive s, a n d  B arga in ing  in the J a p a n ese  E conom y, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
p. 214.
14. Exceptions are production under licence and certain cases of OEM production, where 
manufacturers depend on licensers or OEM buyers for the design of the products. In the 
early post-WWII period, passenger cars such as Austin, Hillman or Renault were 
produced in Japan under a licence provided by British and French automakers. There are 
cases where the modelling of cars and consumer electric appliances, or the design of 
semiconductor circuits, are undertaken by outside designers and software engineers.
15. Exceptions are some of the Japanese firms which enjoy a dominant position close 
to monopoly in their respective fields. YKK, a zipper maker, and Shimano, a maker of 
bicycle parts, make by themselves most of manufacturing equipment they use, or design 
such equipment by themselves and have other specialized firms manufacture it for them. 
The exclusive access to such manufacturing equipment seems to be the basis of their 
dominance.
16. Various sources cite the external procurement ratio of Japanese automakers in the 
range of 65 to 75 per cent, that of US automakers from 30 to 50 per cent, and that of 
European automakers in between. See for example B. Asanuma and T. Kikutani, “ Risk 
absorption in Japanese Subcontracting: A Microeconometric Study of the Automobile 
Industries” , J ou r, o f  the J a p a n ese  a n d  In tern ational E con om ies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992, 
footnote 2, p. 2, and R. E. Cole and T. Yakushiji (eds.), The A m erican  a n d  J a p a n ese  
A u to  In d u strie s  in T ran sition , Center for Japanese Studies. Univ. of Michigan: Ann 
Arbor, 1984, p. 30.
17. This is true also of large manufacturing corporations in other fields such as electric 
machinery and chemicals. The number of employees (in 1990-91) of some of the giant 
US and European corporations are: IBM (383.2 thousand employees), General Electric 
(298.0), Siemens (287.6), Bayer (168. 0), BASF (137.0), Imperial Chemical Industries 
(ICI, 134.0). The only comparable giant manufacturing corporations in Japan are Hitachi 




























































































Toshiba (162.0 and 72.0) and a few others. For large corporations in the retail trade, see 
note 18 below.
18. The same tendency is observed also in a comparison between large Japanese and US 
retail companies as the table below shows. The reasons for this are: (1) in Japan, a 
larger part of retail-related operations, such as purchasing, transportation, packaging, 
delivery and consumer credit services are undertaken by outside companies or 
subsidiaries, that is, the degree of ‘tight vertical integration’ in Japan’s retail trade is 
lower; and (2) part-timers and sales clerks seconded from wholesalers or manufacturers 
account for a large part of sales clerks at Japan’s large retailers and are not counted as 
‘regular employees’ of the ‘core’ retailing firms.
A Comparison of Sales and the Number of Employees between 













Daiei (c) 18.6 30.8 0.60 n.a.
(uc) 15.0 18.7 0.80 56
Marui (c) 4.5 12.6 0.36 n.a.
(uc) 4.2 8.7 0.48 41
[US]
Sears-Ruebuck (c) 57.2 450.0 0.13 n.a.
K-Mart (c) 34.6 349.0 0.10 n.a.
Sources: Same as for Table 1. For the accounting year ending December 1991, January 
or February 1992. (c) and (uc) mean data on consolidated and unconsolidated bases 
respectively.
19. If wages, salaries and other labour costs were lower, and other components of value 
added higher in Japan than in other industrialized countries, the ratio of sales to the 
number of employees could be higher in Japan without a higher ratio of procurement 
of parts and other supplies from outside. This is not the case, however. It is seen from 
the last column of Table 1 that labour costs per employee paid by Japanese automakers 
seem higher than, or more or less comparable to, those paid by their counterparts in 
other countries, although here again conceptual differences may not be easy to reconcile.
A second reason for the differences between Japanese automakers and US and 
European automakers in the ratio of sales to employees may be that annual working 
hours of Japanese workers (some 2,050 hours) are longer than those of the United States 
and European workers (some 1,800 hours in the United States, 1,600 hours in West 
Germany, and 1,400 hours in Sweden). Also usually only regular employees are counted 




























































































seasonal workers, part-timers and workers sent to the factory from outside firms 
uncounted (I wonder how part-timers and temporary workers are counted in financial 
reports of US and European corporations). But taking into account these factors would 
not alter the main conclusion in the text.
By the way, it is sometimes argued in Western Europe that Japan’s much longer 
annual working hours than those of West European countries poses a threat to West 
European industry. This is something like ‘the yellow peril’ argument in the past, and 
is absurdly ridiculous as well. The labour factor that affects international comparative 
advantage or ‘competitiveness’ of an industry is the labour costs per hour as measured 
by wages, bonuses, employee benefits and social welfare costs, and how intelligently and 
efficiently employees work each hour. Whether annual working hours in a country are 
longer or shorter than those of its trading partners has nothing to do with an advantage 
or disadvantage for industries in international trade.
20. In Western Europe, the sales tax in the past might have promoted vertical integration 
and its effects and resulting practices might still persist today.
21. See Masataka Ikeda, “ An International Comparison of the Production System in the 
TV Set Industry”  (in Japanese), in P a p ers  C om m em oratin g  th e 100 th  A n n iversa ry  of 
Chuo University, Faculty of Economics, Chuo University, 1985; “ Parts Procurement 
Policy of Japanese-Owned Manufacturing Firms in Britain”  (in Japanese), Shoko K in yu  
(Commercial and Industrial Finance), Voi. 42, No. 12 (December 1992), pp. 3-20, and 
his other works quoted therein.
22. See B. Asanuma, “ The Structure of Parts Transactions in Japan” , K e iz a i R on so  
(Collection of Articles on Economics, Kyoto University), March 1984, and “ The 
Structure of Parts Transactions in the Auto Industry” , K ikan  G en d a i K e iz a i  (the 
Contemporary Economy Quarterly) No. 58, 1984 (both in Japanese).
23. In Japan, parts makers in the automobile or other machinery industries are 
sometimes called sh itau ke  firms, which may be translated as ‘subcontractors’. This word 
may not be inappropriate for parts makers using the ‘lent’ plan, or metalworking firms 
undertaking processing of parts for the parent maker under piecework payment contracts. 
But it would not be too fitting to parts makers using the ‘approved’ plan. The latter type 
parts maker include giant firms such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, and Nihon Denso, 
and often have high technological capability and strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
parent automakers.
24. See the Office of the Fair Trade Commission, A S u rvey o f  In terfirm  T ran saction  
P ra c tic e s  (in Japanese), June 1991, p. 33.
25. M. Ikeda, “ Parts Procurement Policy of Japanese-Owned Manufacturing Firms in 
Britain” , o p . c it., pp. 15-16.
26. See K. Shibayama, K. Kiyono and M. Kiji, “ Competition and Organization in the 
Distribution Sector: An International Comparison of Systematization of Distribution” , 




























































































27. The wage differentials are now not as large as in the 1950s and 1960s, but still exist. 
There are several views on how to explain the wage differentials. For my own view, see 
Ryutaro Komiya, The J a p a n ese  E conom y: T rade, Industry, a n d  G overn m en t, The 
University of Tokyo Press, 1990, chs. 4-6.
The wage differentials between large and small firms had been described previously 
as reflecting ‘the dual structure’ of the Japanese economy, which means an economic 
system consisting of two different sectors -  the modem sector (large firms) and the pre­
modem or semi-feudal sector (small firms and agriculture). Marxist economists, as well 
as those economic historians and economists specialized in small business problems who 
were strongly influenced by Marxist economics, argued that under the dual structure 
large firms (monopoly capital) exploited workers by keeping wages low from the Meiji 
era until the 1960s (or even afterward). The traditional theory of the dual structure, 
therefore, is that parent manufacturers exploit subcontractors supplying parts and survive 
recession mainly at the expense of subcontractors by transferring the burden of recession 
on to them, thus exploiting the working class, small businesses and farmers.
It appears to me impossible, however, that parent firms exploit subcontractors 
constantly and always pass the burden of recession on to them. The exploitation and 
burden-transfer argument, which was once dominant in Japan, is contradictory to the 
basic principle of economics that accumulation of profits (owned capital) is necessary 
for the development of industries and enterprises. If parent firms do always ‘exploit’ 
subcontractors or transfer the burden of recession on to subcontractors, the latter would 
turn away from the parent firms or have to quit the business. The growth of parent firms 
requires that their subcontractors grow too. To that end, the subcontractors themselves 
must increase their owned capital and borrowings, which requires sufficiently high 
profits -  there would be no financial institutions which lend money to firms that do not 
earn adequate profits. During a period of high growth when the sales of a parent firm 
doubled or tripled over three or five years, the sales of its first-layer and second-layer 
parts suppliers also doubled or tripled or even more. During that period, natural selection 
or survival of the fittest prevailed as some firms failed while new ones entered and 
prospered.
28. See F. Ohta, H. Nakanishi, K. Kida and T. Ohtani, “ Application of Electronic 
Technology and a Changing Pattern of Division of Labour in the Automobile Industry” , 
MITI/RI Discussion Paper, June 1991.
29. See Ryutaro Komiya, The J a pan ese  E conom y: T rade, In du stry  a n d  G overn m en t, op . 
cit.; Kenichi Imai and Ryutaro Komiya (eds.), J a p a n ese  F irm s (in Japanese), The 
University of Tokyo Press, 1989 (an English version translated under the supervision of 
-  and edited by -  Ronald P. Dore to be published shortly by MIT Press).
Japanese executives and employees dislike seeing their companies absorbed or taken 
over by and merged with other companies. Japanese companies seriously endeavour to 
maintain their corporate independence unless they face severe financial difficulties and 
find it hard to remain independent. This is because in many cases, mergers and 
acquisitions will go not only against executives but also against middle-management 
employees in absorbed or acquired firms in terms of promotion and career. This 
tendency to remain independent can be observed, for instance, even among the top 
companies in the Mitsubishi group, whose presidents meet regularly: there are a number 




























































































Petrochemical, Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, Mitsubishi Resin., Mitsubishi Monsanto 
Chemicals, and Mitsubishi Rayon. In US or European environments, these companies 
would be organized as just one company. The presidents meeting of the Mitsubishi 
group once requested Mitsubishi Chemical and Mitsubishi Petrochemical to merge, but 
such a merger did not materialize because Mitsubishi Petrochemical resisted strongly.
30. According to a survey conducted by the Fair Trade Commission, the parent makers 
of consumer electric appliances (colour TV sets and washing machines) generally do not 
hold shares of their parts subcontractors and suppliers. Moreover, when they hold shares 
of subcontractors and suppliers, generally the proportion of shares held amounts to less 
than 10 per cent. In the case of coulour TV sets, the parent makers are the shareholders 
of only 5.5 per cent of their subcontractors and suppliers, and in the case of washing 
machines of 8.9 per cent. See A Su rvey o f  Interfirm  T ran saction  P ra c tic e s , o p . c it., pp. 
45-46.
31. For details, see F. Ohta e t  a l., “ Application of Electronic Technology and a 
Changing Pattern of Division of Labour in the Automobile Industry” , op . cit.
32. For the situation in the automobile industry, see the article cited in the preceding 
note. Nissan and Toyota each has a sort of ‘league’ of ‘cooperating’ companies, of 
which ‘first-layer’ subcontractors are members. The number of such companies for 
Nissan or Toyota is 190-230, with some 50 firms overlapping. In the consumer electric 
appliances industry also, the parent makers and parts makers deal with each other on a 
long-term, continuous basis, but the pattern of relationship is multilateral rather than 
pyramidal, perhaps more so than in the automobile industry. See A S u rvey  o f  In terfirm  
T ra n sa ctio n  P ra c tic e s , op . c it., pp. 29-43.
33. The number of patents a company has obtained is not always a good measure of the 
extent of its success in R&D. Commercial value of patents varies widely and most 
patents bear no or little value.
34. See below for the case of Japan’s photocopier makers.
35. ‘QC’ here originally meant quality control, but ‘QC circles’ activities have evolved 
to cover not only quality control but all sorts of efforts for improving productivity, 
product quality and working conditions.
36. However, fierce competition among Japanese shipbuilders meant that their profit 
rates were generally low. Their success benefited shipping business worldwide, 
consumers in general, and workers in Japan’s shipbuilding industry, but did not benefit 
the shareholders of Japanese shipbuilding companies a great deal.
37. There are arguments that consider patent and other intellectual property rights as 
sacred and inviolable, but it should be remembered that certain types of new ideas and 
excellent inventions, however beneficial they are to mankind, bring little economic 
remuneration to the conceivers.




























































































Crises” , C a rn eg ie -R o ch es te r  C on ference S erie s on P u b lic  P o lic y , Vol. 20 (1984); 
reprinted in: R. Komiya, The J a pan ese  E conom y, o p . c it., esp. pp. 340-44.
39. There are more machine tool makers and semiconductor makers in the US than in 
Japan, but most of them are not categorized as the ‘mass-production’ type.
40. The fact that the merger between Nissan and Prince (it may be more appropriately 
called Nissan’s absorption of Prince) was not too successful has perhaps discouraged 
similar deals. The market share of the merged company dropped below the aggregated 
share of the two partners and the merger improved financial conditions little.
41. Some of the eight automakers are in shareholding relations. As of March 1991, 
Toyota holds 14.5 per cent of Daihatsu’s shares, while Nissan owns 4.23 per cent of 
Fuji’s. But the former shareholding is smaller than Ford’s 24 per cent share in Mazda, 
and the latter is smaller than Chrysler’s 11 per cent share in Mitsubishi Motors. Toyota 
and Daihatsu cooperate in technological development and production, but compete in 
sales both at home and overseas, as is the case with Nissan and Fuji.
42. Beginning from the assertion by Karl Marx in D a s  K a p ita l, there is a widespread 
belief that capitalistic development necessarily results in concentration and accumulation 
of capital leading to ‘monopoly capitalism’. It can be seen from the following table that 
the fact of the matter is not so simple, even in the case of the automobile industry where 
many people believe economies of scale are most important.
Shares of Japanese Automobile Manufacturers in 












Source: H an dbook  o f  the A u tom ob ile  In du stry  (in 
Japanese).
It is difficult to foresee, however, whether the trend stated here will continue in the 
future when electronic control technology is more widely applied to automobiles and 
auto manufacturing, and when the auto market becomes saturated. More mergers, 
acquisitions and tie-ups might take place, and it is not altogether unlikely that a trend 





























































































43. This idea is close to the philosophy of the former COMECON (or CEMA). Under 
COMECOM, each member country was planned -  or ordered -  to specialize in one, two 
or three subsectors of the auto industry -  such as passenger cars, trucks, buses and 
forklifts -  to realize economies of scale.
44. Ampex (US) and Philips (Netherlands) held the basic patents of VCR -  which have 
now expired -  and began producing VCR for broadcasting and industrial use much 
earlier than Japanese makers. Later the Japanese makers became pioneers in manufactur­
ing much cheaper VCRs for household use.
45. It is interesting to ask why no (or few) European makers successfully entered the 
market of photocopier machines and VCRs, which are among the contemporary growth 
industries, while many Japanese (and some Korean and Taiwanese firms) succeeded to 
establish footholds in these markets.
46. Yet there are three makers (Matsushita, Sanyo, and Brother) which produce 
photocopiers without belonging to this ‘patent club’. Since the court ruling on Xerox' 
patent right in 1970, patent technologies have been little barrier to latecomers in 
photocopier manufacturing. Since the Xerox patent in question was to expire in 1974, 
Japanese makers would have entered this field sooner or later. There is a view, however, 
that a technological gap might develop among photocopier makers in the future when 
electronic technologies are applied more extensively to photocopiers.
47. See Y. Tarui and Japan Association of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment 
(eds.), H a n d o tlti R ikkoku N ipon  (Development of Japan as a Leading Semiconductor 
Producing Country), Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun-sha, 1991, esp. pp. lOOff.
48. For these reasons, I doubt the validity of the econometric studies attempting to 
measure the extent of ‘economies of scale' in the machinery industry. In such studies, 
the results of C en su s o f  M an u factu rers or their returns are used as a starting point for 
the quantitative analysis of plant-based economies of scale, but the three problems stated 
in the text already exist there. Studies on firm-based economies of scale need to be 
based upon corporate financial reports, where the three obstacles are much more serious.
49. Some of the manufacturers of parts and manufacturing equipment serving Japan’s 
mass-production machinery industries are enjoying large -  nearly monopolistic or 
duopolistic -  market shares and are reaping high profits. Examples are: Kyocera 
(semiconductor ceramics packages), Fanuc (CNC for NC machine tools), Shimano 
(bicycle parts), and some of the makers of semiconductor-manufacturing equipment.
50. As a result of the formation of a ‘Single European Market’ in 1992 many European 
experts say that some benefits of economies of scale will be realized soon. But what 
kind of benefits exactly are they? As far as the machinery industry in a wider sense is 
concerned, can one expect the Single Market to increase the sizes of plants and firms 
in Europe through mergers and acquisitions, thereby creating the benefits of ‘economies 
of scale’? Even now, however, major European firms and their factories seem larger 
than their Japanese counterparts. European automakers generally employ many more 
workers than Japanese automakers (see Table 1). Yet some of them cannot compete 




























































































that an attempt by the Europeans to seek economies of scale by simply enlarging the 
size of firms, for example, by encouraging mergers, is unlikely to succeed.
51. In Japan, a dealership network or channel, sometimes called ‘distribution k e ire tsu ’, 
in automobile marketing means a nationwide sales network of dealers under the same 
channel name. Major automakers have three to five such dealership networks. Each 
dealer in a network deals with the same 5-10 brands of passenger cars and commercial 
vehicles channelled through the network.
52. For instance, Toyota’s Mark II, Chaser, and Cresta are only slightly different to each 
other but are sold through different networks, as are Honda’s Accord and Ascot.
53. In a survey conducted by MITI, a ‘producing region’ is defined as an area in which 
a large number of small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms -  sometimes more than 
50, or even more than 100 firms -  produce the same kind of products amounting to 
more than 500 million yen in value, and where the products are marketed nationwide 
or exported. Well-known examples of such products are ceramics of Arita (Saga Pref.), 
Seto (Aichi), and Mino (Gifu); cutlery of Seki (Gifu); spectacles of Sabae (Fukui); and 
student uniforms of Kojima (Okayama) . There are no less than 500 (!) such ‘producing 
regions’ in Japan. I suppose there are far fewer such regions in other industrialized 
countries.
54. It was often said in the past that Europe lost its competitive edge in such fields as 
shipbuilding, cameras, watches and motorcycles to Japan because of lower wages in the 
latter. But was this really the case? The low wage level in one country is undoubtedly 
an important factor that determines the competitiveness of its industries in international 
markets. But do the European countries whose wage levels are now lower than that of 
Japan, such as Britain, Italy, Portugal and Spain, have competitive edge over Japan in 
labour-intensive machinery industries? It appears to me that certain factors other than 
the wage level, such as industrial and enterprise organization, were more important in 
the relative decline of Europe and the rise of Japan in certain fields of the machinery 
industry.
55. As noted earlier, even when a parent maker holds shares of a parts maker such 
shareholding is usually a very small minority holding in most cases, except where the 
latter was first established as a subsidiary of the former. The parts maker is little 
restrained in dealing with parent makers other than the particular one, unless the latter 
holds a large amount of shares of the former.
56. Recently I have come to realize that the same reason applies regarding the basis of 
Japan’s strong comparative advantage in ‘new’ (high-quality) synthetic fibre textiles. In 
this field, synthetic fibre makers, spinners, weavers, dyers and apparel makers cooperate 





























































































Table 1 A Comparison of Sales and the Number of Employees between Japanese, 
American and European Automakers













Toyota (uc)2 66.4 75.3 0.88 46
Nissan (c) 47.6 143.9 0.33 n.a.
(uc) 31.7 55.6 0.57 44
Mazda (c) 20.2 36.6 0.55 n.a.
(uc) 17.1 29.8 0.57 41
Honda (C) 32.6 90.5 0.36 n.a.
(uc) 21.6 31.5 0.69 42
Mitsubishi (uc) 19.0 26.5 0.72 47
Suzuki (C) 9.3 24.4 0.38 n.a.
(uc) 7.8 12.8 0.61 36
Daihatsu (c) 6.5 19.7 0.33 n.a.
(uc) 5.8 11.8 0.49 45
Fuji Heavy (c) 7.7 18.8 0.41 n.a.
Industries (uc) 6.1 14.8 0.41 41
[US]
General Motors (c) 123.1 756.3 0.16 39
Ford (c) 88.3 332.7 0.27 38
Chrysler (C) 29.4 124.0 0.24 n.a.
[EUROPE]
Daimler-Benz (c) 57.3 376.4 0.15 47
Volkswagen (C) 46.0 260.1 0.18 n.a
Fiat (c) 45.5 288.0 0.16 38
Renault (c) 29.4 147.2 0.20 36
Volvo (C) 12.8 63.6 0.20 46
Sources: Financial reports of each corporation for 12 month period ending March 1992 
(Japan) or December 1991 (others). Sales and labour costs are converted to US dollar 
values by the annual average exchange rates published in International Monetary Fund, 
In tern a tio n a l F in an cia l S ta tis tics .
1. For Japanese corporations total labour costs, for others ‘pay-roll’, ‘employee 
compensation’, ‘staff costs’ or ‘wages and salaries’, divided by the number of 
employees.




























































































Table 2 Japan’s Balance of Payments on Technologies Vis-à-vis Europe and the 
United States
(Unit: billions of yen)
Fiscal year Exports Imports Balance
[EUROPE] 1975 14.0 59.9 -45.9
1980 29.0 82.1 -53.1
1985 45.4 81.6 -36.1
1989 65.0 118.2 -53.1
1990 61.5 112.8 -51.3
[US] 1975 14.2 107.5 -93.3
1980 29.5 156.8 -127.4
1985 58.7 210.3 -151.5
1989 115.1 210.7 -121.1
1990 108.1 257.9 -149.8
Source: The Bureau of Statistics, the Prime Minister’s Office, R e p o r t on  th e S u rvey  o f  
S cien tific  R esearch  a n d  D eve lo p m en t (in Japanese), 1991. Exports here mean the receipts 
of technology loyalties and other payments related to technology transfer, while imports 
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